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Iowa teachers, superintendents, and board members expected outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act

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Iowa teachers, superintendents, and board members
expected outcomes of the Iowa Public
Employment Relations Act

by

Harlan Eugene Else

A Dissertation Submitted to the
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

On April 23, 1974, Governor Robert D. Ray signed into law a bill, earlier passed by the Sixty-fifth General Assembly of the State of Iowa, which gives public sector employees the right to bargain collectively with their employers. This law, called the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act (Chapter 20, School Laws of Iowa), become effective on July 1, 1975. It is this law with which this study will deal.

The Problem

It was the purpose of this study to report what could be found in authoritative literature and through a survey research project as to whether or not there was a significant difference in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act between and among groups of randomly selected Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members.

More specifically this study attempted to determine:

1. If there were significant differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act between and among groups of Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members.
2. If there were significant differences in expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the

Iowa Public Employment Relations Act between and among groups of Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members in the twenty-five largest pupil enrollment school districts, except Des Moines, as compared to those from the twenty-five smallest pupil enrollment school districts.

3. If there were significant differences in expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment relations Act among Iowa elementary and secondary teachers relative to their differences in whether they are male or female, number of years of teaching experience, and whether the financial remuneration they receive from teaching is a primary or secondary source of family income.
4. If there were differences in the expected long-range outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among Iowa teachers, superintendents, and board members relative to whether or not the school district of which they were a part had a formal teacher bargaining unit.
5. If there were significant differences in expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among superintendents in the study relative to their differences in total years of experience as a school superintendent.

Need for the Study

Teacher collective bargaining can be anticipated to have an impact upon the education that present and future generations of Iowa school children will receive. By ascertaining the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of teacher collective bargaining from the principal participants in this new venture, it may be possible to project the degree and direction of this impact.

If board members and educators can gain some concept of the ultimate outcomes of teacher collective bargaining as a result of this study, perhaps it will be more feasible to determine the effect of each item bargained for upon future generations of Iowa school children. This will, perhaps, enable Iowa educators to more clearly see each item as part of the whole--the education of Iowa's children.

The effect of teacher collective bargaining on curriculum and instruction is certainly an area which is of interest and concern to the citizens of Iowa. Ascertaining the effect that teacher collective bargaining may have on curriculum and instruction as perceived by teachers, superintendents and board members may help to subvert detrimental results later.

Knowledge of expected outcomes of each of the bargaining factions may also help to prevent unnecessary confusion and frustration brought about by a lack of mutual understanding among the bargaining parties concerning one another's attitudes,

motives, and hopes relative to the collective bargaining process.

Since teacher collective bargaining has impact upon public funds and a public institution, a further need for this study was to provide the public with insight into the possible degree and direction of this impact. This, perhaps, will enable the public to provide input into the bargaining process before issues upon which teachers and boards of education are negotiating are ratified.

Definition of Terms

1. Collective bargaining - used in this study to identify the process by which teachers of a particular school district, through representatives which they have chosen, can negotiate their terms of employment as a group with the board of education or its representative(s). Gardner (18, p. 14) defines collective bargaining as:

. . . a procedure whereby duly authorized representatives of labor and management get together on an equal basis to exchange ideas and positions pertinent to the interests of both groups for development in good faith of a contractual agreement on operations of work to be performed for a specific period of time.

Herring and Rossetti (25, p. 323) say:

The function of negotiations, particularly as it relates to schools, is the resolution of differences between labor, the teachers, and management, the school board. The negotiators,

as representatives of these groups, are charged with the responsibility of defending their respective group's demands and standards, and of resolving intergroup conflict.

This study will deal specifically with teacher collective bargaining as it is currently being implemented under the authority and regulation of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act described in detail in Chapter Two. For the purposes of this study, the terms "collective negotiations" and "professional negotiations" will be considered synonymous with "collective bargaining."

2. Expected outcomes - used in this study to identify the benefits and/or negative aspects which the participants in the study believe will accrue as a result of teacher collective bargaining. The expected outcomes considered in this study can generally be classified into two categories - instructional and noninstructional.
3. Instructional outcomes - used in this study to identify issues which contain provisions covering working conditions which directly influence classroom practices (e.g., class size, maximum teaching hours, use of aides, school calendar, textbook and curriculum review, teacher qualifications and evaluation, student discipline policies, the principal's role as the instructional leader of the school, and parent participation).
4. Noninstructional outcomes - used in this study to identify issues which contain provisions covering salary and fringe

benefit issues and the relationship between and among the principal parties in the collective bargaining process (e.g., teacher-principal relationships, teacher-board relationships, teacher-public relationships, grievance procedures, and job satisfaction for teachers, board members, and superintendents).

5. Policy - used in this study to mean school district policy and the accompanying rules and regulations determined by the board of education and which have the force and effect of law within the confines of a particular school district. The authority for the establishment and enforcement of board policy comes from section 279.8 of the Iowa Code (43) which states in part:

The board shall make rules for its own government and that of the directors, officers, teachers, and pupils, and for the care of the schoolhouse, grounds, and property of the school corporation, and aid in the enforcement of same, and acquire the performance of duties by said persons imposed by law and the rules.

6. Terms of employment - used in this study to mean the specific obligations upon which the employing school district and teacher employees have agreed. These specific obligations include agreements as to salary, fringe benefits, length of contract, hours, leaves of absence, health and safety matters, evaluation procedures, procedures for staff reduction, and in-service training. Terms of employment could possibly also include such items

as class size, facility requirements, the teachers' role in curriculum development and policy making, although non-mandatory items for bargaining in Iowa at this time (1977).

7. Master contract - used in this study to mean the written document which delineates the terms of employment which have been agreed to through the collective bargaining procedure.

Delimitations

This study was limited to a description of the groups herein surveyed as being representative of like groups of public school teachers, superintendents and board members throughout the State of Iowa. No attempt will be made to make assumptions about the expected outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among teachers, superintendents and board members beyond those found in Iowa.

There are limitations to a survey in terms of the yield of purely objective data. A specific attitude expressed on a survey of the type used in this study may be the result of a recent event in the respondent's experience which may have an effect upon the respondent's expressed attitude at the time of completing the survey but may actually not be a long term or highly valued attitude. Therefore, the time frame of the attitudes or expected outcomes data collected in this study is limited to the period of time used to complete the survey.

The expected outcomes of the respondents may, at any point in time since the administration of the survey, have been altered by the respondents' individual and collective experiences.

Sources of Data

Data for the review of literature was obtained primarily through the assistance of the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) and the Iowa Network For Obtaining Resource Materials for Schools (INFORMS). The Iowa Association of School Boards, Iowa Association of School Administrators, Iowa Association of Secondary School Principals, Iowa Association of Elementary School Principals, and Iowa Council of Area School Boards also provided assistance in obtaining data for the review of literature.

The survey instrument used to collect data for the study was developed with the assistance of students in a graduate course, Administration of School Personnel, at Iowa State University and field tested through a pilot study under the supervision of Dr. Anton J. Netusil.

The number of individuals randomly selected for participation in the study consisted of twenty-five board members, twenty-five superintendents, and three hundred teachers from Iowa's twenty-five largest pupil enrollment school districts; and twenty-five board members, twenty-five superintendents, and three hundred teachers from Iowa's twenty-five smallest pupil enrollment school districts.

Administration of the survey to the randomly selected sample described above was via the U.S. mail.

Organization of the Study

This study was organized using the five chapter approach to reporting research through a dissertation. Chapter One was written so as to provide the reader with an overview of the specific problem undertaken by the researcher; Chapter Two was completed so as to provide the researcher the background necessary to do the study; Chapter Three describes the manner in which the research was carried out, including data collection and treatment; Chapter Four contains both a tabular presentation and a narrative description of the findings of this study; and Chapter Five contains a summary of the findings, the researcher's conclusions about the study, and recommendations which were made as a result of the study.

CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

In recent years teachers' attitudes relative to the teacher-board of education relationship in establishing teacher salaries and working conditions have undergone some severe changes. Terms such as "collective bargaining" and "teacher strikes," which have now replaced such terms as "professional negotiations" and "withholding of services," would have been abhorrent in the minds of many teachers as recently as ten years ago.

In this chapter the writer has reviewed the literature relative to the history of teacher collective bargaining in the United States, examined in some detail the Iowa Public Employees Relations Act, and reported what could be found in the literature relative to teachers', superintendents', and board members' expected outcomes of formalized teacher collective bargaining.

Teachers' Unions

Inherent to the right to bargain is the formation of a bargaining unit, which often implies that employees will form or belong to a labor union or professional association. Although teachers have held membership in professional associations for many years, the relationship of teachers to labor

unions was for a period of time legally unclear. Teachers' right to union membership has not always been a legal prerogative. In two landmark decisions, one in Chicago in 1917, (People ex rel Fursman v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 N.E. 158) and in Seattle in 1930, (Seattle High School Chapter No. 200 of the AFT v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424, 293 Pac, 994) board rules against union membership were upheld in the courts (34).

In the Chicago case the rule was upheld because ". . . it was inimical to the efficiency of the teaching force, and detrimental to the welfare of the public school system." The Chicago rule stated that teachers were not to be employed if they held union membership, and if teachers who were already employed violated the rule, they were subject to dismissal (34).

In the Seattle case, the courts upheld the board rule which prohibited membership in the American Federation of Labor or its locals. All prospective teachers were required to sign a declaration of nonmembership (13).

The Federal Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. Although this act did not extend the right to union membership to public employees, school boards began to exhibit a more lenient attitude toward membership in teachers' organizations of all kinds (34).

The right of teachers to union membership was later upheld in a Connecticut court decision of 1951 (4) (Norwalk Teachers'

Assn. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A(2d) 482). The Norwalk case said that teachers do have the right to union affiliation.

While teachers have gained the right to union membership, the courts have consistently upheld teachers' rights to non-membership. The concept of a "union shop" enforced by boards of education has been expressly prohibited in several court rulings--most notably in Montana in 1959 (12) (Benson v. School District No. 1 of Silver Bow County, 136 Montana 77, 344 P. 2d 117). In this case, three important legal principles were established relative to union nonmembership:

1. A board of education lacks authority to require union membership on the part of school teachers as a condition to receiving an increased salary.
2. A board of education has no power to discriminate between teachers employed by it as to amount of salary to be paid them on the basis of their membership in a labor union.
3. An agreement by a board of education to hire only union members would clearly be an illegal discrimination (12, p. 135).

In addition to the above decision, several states have adopted statutes outlawing clauses in teachers' contracts requiring membership in any specific organization as a condition of employment (34).

Collective Bargaining

The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 specifically excludes public employees from the collective bargaining

process. Even so, the Act does provide a framework or model through which bargaining by teachers' groups may be instituted with the school board (34).

The landmark case (4) in Connecticut in 1951 established the following legal principles:

1. Collective bargaining or professional negotiation is legally permissible between a board of education and an organization of its employees, if the strike threat is absent.
2. An organization of employees and a board of education may not negotiate a contract which involves the surrender of the board's legal discretion, is contrary to law, or is otherwise ultra vires.

In 1959, Wisconsin enacted the first legislation for teacher-board bargaining. Between 1960 and 1970 nearly forty per cent of the state legislatures enacted collective bargaining statutes for their teachers (28). The increased number of states enacting teacher collective bargaining statutes received heightened impetus from Executive Orders 10988 (14) and 11491 (15). These Executive Orders established the formal framework for effective bargaining for federal employees. In the area of education, these orders include teachers employed by the defense department overseas dependent schools.

Executive Order 10988 (14) was signed by President John F. Kennedy, January 17, 1962. This order gave federal employees the right to organize and to consult with employing agencies concerning the formulation and implementation of policies and practices affecting employee working conditions.

This order also provided for the formal, informal, and exclusive recognition of the bargaining unit while excluding managerial personnel from the bargaining unit. Although Executive Order 10988 (14) authorized impasse arbitration, findings were not binding. No mention of salary negotiation was made; and, although the strike was not specifically outlawed, no agent which authorized the use of the strike could be recognized.

Executive Order 10988 (14) was superseded effective July 1, 1970, by Executive Order 11491 (15) which was signed by President Richard M. Nixon on October 29, 1969. Negotiable areas and personnel covered by the two orders are essentially the same.

Executive Order 11491 (15), however, created three new federal regulatory agencies to deal with labor relations problems. These are the Federal Relations Council, which is charged with administration of the Order; the Federal Service Impasse Panel, which may negotiate impasses; and an Assistant Secretary of Labor-Management Relations, who handles unit representation disputes.

While Executive Order 11491 (15) does make provisions for grievance arbitration; like Order 10988 (14), recommendations by mediators or arbitrators for impasse resolution are not binding.

The primary difference between the executive orders described above and the state statutes reviewed is that under most state laws salaries and other economic issues are negotiable, whereas they are not under the federal executive orders.

Education U.S.A. (16) reported that by November, 1976, a total of thirty-four state legislatures had enacted public employee collective bargaining statutes. These teacher collective bargaining statutes which have been enacted at the state level vary widely in scope and detail. They can be classified in two ways: (1) permissive or mandatory and (2) conference or bargaining. These classifications of legislation relative to teacher collective bargaining are defined as follows:

Permissive legislation - grants teachers and boards the right to confer or bargain at the option of one or the other.

Mandatory legislation - requires teacher-board bargaining.

Conference legislation - gives official sanctions to teacher-board dialogue but imposes few obligations on either party.

Bargaining legislation - introduces new concepts and imposes new obligations into already established teacher-board relations (21).

The statutes which have been enacted thus far by the states' legislatures vary in their definition of such basic elements as the scope of negotiations, unit representation, procedural matters, appellate procedure, and other issues related to the settlement of disputes.

Palmer (36) analyzed twenty-eight state statutes and one territorial statute using the following seven criteria:

1. Who is included under the statute
2. Selection and recognition of the bargaining unit
3. Type of negotiation specified (i.e. meet and confer, etc.)
4. Negotiation procedures, if any
5. Limitations on areas of negotiation
6. Impasse procedures
7. Strikes

Palmer (36) concluded that, of the twenty-nine statutes he reviewed, a composite statute would include the following features based on the seven criteria:

1. It would include only teachers and some or all administrators.
2. Selection of the bargaining unit would be by voluntary employer recognition of majority status except in case of dispute when an election would determine the bargaining unit. Recognition would be exclusive.

3. Good faith negotiation would be required of employers and employees.
4. No negotiation procedures would be specified.
5. Negotiations would be limited to wages, hours and other conditions of employment.
6. Nonbinding mediation and/or fact-finding and/or arbitration would be required in case of impasse.
7. The strike would be declared illegal.

Even without state statutes, the courts have been consistently involved in the issues of teacher collective bargaining. The court's rationale for treating teacher-board bargaining issues was illustrated in the Norwalk teachers' case cited earlier. A more recent case (Chicago Division Illinois Education Association v. Board of Education (1966) 76 Illinois Appellate 2d 456) upheld the Chicago board's agreement to bargain with the Chicago teachers' union despite the absence of enabling legislation. The overriding opinion in that case was as follows:

Conflicts in teacher-board relations are inherent in the employment relationship and must be resolved in an orderly, efficient manner (21, p. 214).

It is apparent that collective bargaining between teachers and boards of education has now been firmly established and state legislatures will continue to enact legislation to this effect. The traditional paternalistic employer-employee model

of the past no longer is acceptable to a substantial number of teachers.

In addition to state legislatures enacting teacher collective bargaining statutes, the United States Congress has shown interest in enacting a federal bargaining law which would grant collective bargaining rights to teachers and other public employees throughout the country. In 1975, committees in both the House and Senate of the 94th Congress considered two such alternative bills (2). Both of these bills contained the following provisions: (1) provided federal power to force school boards across the country into collective bargaining; (2) established the federal government as the final arbitrator in labor disputes between teachers and school boards; (3) provided that boards of education must bargain matters of educational policy with their employees; and (4) sanctioned strikes under a number of circumstances (1).

One of the bills, supported by the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and the American Federation of Teachers, would have placed public employee bargaining units under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board which, since 1934, has regulated only private-sector bargaining practices. The other bill, supported by the National Education Association, would have given public employees essentially the same collective bargaining rights as the first bill, but would have created a separate and parallel board outside the National Labor Relations Board

to regulate public-sector bargaining (2).

Because of strong demands from the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and labor organizations which represented public employees, including the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association, it appeared likely that the heavily Democratic and pro-labor 94th Congress would pass one or the other of the bills previously described.

According to Steinhilber (51), however, the enactment of a federal collective bargaining law for public employees, including teachers, became somewhat doubtful during the summer of 1976, when the United States Supreme Court ruled in the National League of Cities v. Usery case that the extension of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act to state and local public employees is unconstitutional. The Court said, according to Steinhilber (51), that the state as a "public employer" must retain its responsibility to perform governmental functions that entail the determination of wages, hours, and over-time provisions.

National Education Association President John Ryor said following the Court decision:

". . . this decision . . . strikes at the very core of the power of Congress to act on a federal collective bargaining bill for state and local government employees, including teachers and faculties" (42, p. 40).

Regardless of whether a federal collective bargaining law for public employees is enacted or not, it appears that teacher

collective bargaining is spreading throughout the nation without the aid of such a law. According to a National School Boards Association member survey conducted in 1976 (17), two-thirds of the nation's school boards currently engage in collective bargaining with teacher unions. The pattern, however, varies by region. Outside the South, eighty per cent of the school boards bargain with teachers, most commonly in the East and in urban and suburban school districts. In the South only one in ten school boards is involved in teacher collective bargaining. Certainly, teacher collective bargaining appears to be a national movement that is here to stay.

Teacher Strikes

A strike is the cessation of work by a group of employees for the purpose of coercing an employer to accede to some demand which the employees have made upon him and which he has refused (21).

The history of the American labor movement is consistently filled with numerous and oftentimes successfully carried out employee strikes. The strike seems to be a natural outgrowth of a collective bargaining process which has not brought about an employee-employer agreement.

While most states having statutes establishing teacher collective bargaining expressly prohibit the use of strikes, six states (Alaska, California, Idaho, Minnesota, Rhode Island,

Vermont, and Washington) make no mention of strikes in their statutes (28).

Johnson (28) reported in a survey of forty-nine chief state school officers that two states, Michigan and Pennsylvania, authorize strikes of public employees after collective bargaining procedures, including mediation or arbitration, have failed to produce an agreement. In each case a series of steps is to be followed, including serving notice to the other party.

It appears, however, that regardless of the manner in which a state has implemented teacher negotiations statutes, states with bargaining laws have had more strikes than those without. Education U.S.A. (16) reported that since 1958, states with teacher bargaining laws have had more strikes than those without except in 1961, and the number of teacher strikes continues to rise. This report also shows from 1964-1974 the average number of strikes for public employees covered by bargaining laws was at least double that for those not covered. Pennsylvania, for example, averaged six strikes per year before its bargaining law was passed in 1970, and seventy-three strikes per year since then.

Currently, according to the report in Education U.S.A. (16), thirty-four states have legislation setting down guidelines for authorized collective bargaining for public employees. Others will be acting in the near future. It will be interesting to watch how each handles legislation concerning strikes

by public employees. It will also be interesting to see if a result of teacher collective bargaining in Iowa will be an increase in teacher strikes among Iowa's teachers.

Teacher Collective Bargaining Studies Before the
Enactment of the Iowa Public Employment
Relations Act

Before the enactment of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, studies were done at Iowa State University relative to teacher collective bargaining in Iowa by Kenneth F. Palmer (36), Marvin O'Hare (35), Henry Borger (6), and LeRoy Eugene Johnson (28).

Palmer (36) found significant differences of opinion between superintendents and teacher association presidents regarding the need for a collective bargaining statute, who should be included under the law, the negotiable areas to be included in the statute, and the legality of teacher strikes.

O'Hare (35) attempted to delineate the status of the collective negotiation phenomenon as perceived by Iowa teachers and superintendents. While O'Hare found several points of agreement between teachers and superintendents relative to the scope and content of a teacher collective bargaining law, his findings clearly delineated several major points of disagreement between teachers and superintendents in Iowa relative to enactment of a teacher collective bargaining statute. Notable among the findings in O'Hare's (35) study were:

1. elementary and secondary teachers viewed the negotiation phenomenon similarly.
2. respondents from the larger schools tended to express the same attitude toward negotiations as did their counterparts from smaller schools.
3. there was a high degree of job satisfaction among Iowa teachers and superintendents.

Borger (6) attempted to determine the status and content of collective negotiations and the roles of board members and superintendents in collective negotiations as perceived by Iowa board members and superintendents. Notable among the findings in Borger's (6) study were:

1. both board members and superintendents perceived negotiation procedure items and salary policy items as negotiable.
2. board members were more certain than superintendents of their role and the role of the superintendent in collective negotiations.
3. board members were significantly more receptive to the negotiability of issues which pertain to classroom instruction (e.g., curriculum review, development of special education programs, student evaluation, teacher evaluation, and pupil progress reports and promotion policies).

Johnson (28), in another pre-Iowa Public Employment Relations Act study, found that Iowa teachers, elementary principals, secondary principals, superintendents, and board members agreed that:

1. a collective negotiations statute should not allow local school boards to close school as a means to settlement of a dispute.
2. procedures to be followed during the discussions should be agreed upon by the parties involved in the negotiations process, prior to actual negotiations.

3. the negotiating unit for the teachers should be selected by an unbiased election in which each teacher employed is entitled to vote for the unit of his choice.
4. the negotiating unit elected should be the exclusive negotiating unit for all the teachers.
5. expenses incurred by the teachers' negotiating unit should be borne by all of the teachers represented.
6. it is neither favorable nor disfavorable for the principal to assume a position of neutrality during collective negotiations proceedings between the board and teachers.
7. attempts toward solution of a complaint should be made through normal administrative channels before the complaint is considered a grievance.
8. the principal should be the first step in the grievance procedure, unless he is a subject of the grievance.

The data concerning teacher collective bargaining in Iowa which was obtained through research done prior to the enactment of the Iowa Public Employment Act provides many insights into the rationale for many aspects of the collective bargaining statute which was finally enacted. This data also provides some insight into the expected outcomes such a statute will produce.

The Iowa Law

The sixty-fifth General Assembly of the State of Iowa passed the first comprehensive labor relations legislation for Iowa public sector employers and employees on April 4, 1974. Governor Robert D. Ray signed the bill into law on April 23, 1974. This law is called the Iowa Public Employment Relations

Act. The law became effective July 1, 1974, except that the provisions relating to the duty to bargain took effect July 1, 1975, and certain provisions regarding state employees became effective July 1, 1976.

The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act (54) is very specific in establishing the structure and provisions of the collective bargaining process for Iowa's public employees. Provisions include the structure for the administration of the Act, public employer rights, public employee rights, unit representation, the scope of negotiations, procedural matters, impasse procedures, and the no-strike clause.

The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act (54) is definite and restrictive in outlining the scope of negotiable subjects. Section 20.9 (54) states that public employers and employees shall ". . . negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, vacations, insurance, holidays, leaves of absence, shift differentials, overtime compensation, supplemental pay, seniority, transfer procedures, job classifications, health and safety matters, evaluation procedures, procedures for staff reduction, in-service training and other matters mutually agreed upon." Employers must also negotiate an employee grievance procedure and a method of payroll deduction for association dues.

Definitely excluded from negotiations are the authority and power of the merit employment department, Board of Regents'

merit system, educational radio and television facility board's merit system, and the public employee retirement systems including IPERS.

The most intriguing discussions in the bargaining process will be in relation to "and other matters mutually agreed upon." Such nonmandatory subjects of bargaining under the law (54), such as class size, curriculum, supplemental duties, parent-teacher conferences, teaching materials, staff meetings, disruptive students, organizational structure of the school, determination of educational specifications for new buildings, the use of teacher aides, and many other subjects, will certainly be introduced at the bargaining table. Only time will tell what nonmandatory "other matters mutually agreed upon" will actually become a part of the teacher collective bargaining process and to what extent their inclusion in the collective bargaining process will affect public education in Iowa.

The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act (54) provides a definite outline of "procedures" to be followed during the bargaining process and stipulates that a negotiated agreement must be reached between the employer and employee organization no later than one-hundred-twenty days prior to the certified budget submission date of the public employer.

The Act (54) provides a definite set of impasse procedures to be followed if an agreement is not reached by the specified

deadline. These impasse procedures begin at the "mediation" level and may continue through fact-finding and arbitration. The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act (54) is binding in that the arbitrators' decisions are final and must be adhered to by the public employer and the public employee organization.

The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act (54) expressly prohibits strikes by public employees. Section 20.12 (54) of the act makes instigation, encouragement, ratification or participation in a strike by public employees or an employee organization unlawful. Only time will tell whether the combination of binding arbitration and the no-strike clause will, in fact, prevent strikes.

Expected Outcomes

A thorough examination of the literature indicated a very sparse number of research studies or opinions concerning the expected outcomes of teachers, superintendents, and board members relative to teacher collective bargaining.

Several studies have been completed to determine teacher attitudes toward the bargaining process. An examination of these studies will, perhaps, provide insight into expected outcomes in this area.

In a study conducted in 1975, Hennessy (23) sought to ascertain the extent to which Ontario, Quebec and New York teachers were prepared to adopt militant bargaining strategies

and identify factors which may contribute to the development of militant attitudes. The study broadly defined militancy among teachers as "aggressive behavior and conflict-oriented strategies in (teachers') collective contracts with the centers of power and authority in education." The results of the study were that the teachers who responded to the questionnaire preferred nonmilitant methods of negotiations with a high preference stated for use of a professional mediator and an opportunity for presentation of views to the board by teachers. Restriction of teacher services (work-to-the-rule) and the strike showed strong nonpreference. The results of the study further showed that the perceived needs of teachers focus on their professional autonomy and the recognition they receive as individual persons. The dominant theme in comments on the questionnaire was the teachers' sense of isolation; that board members and administrators do not understand the daily demand on their teachers, that the public doesn't really care about them as educators, and that the lines of communication must be repaired.

The Hennessy study (23) also provides some insight into expected instructional outcomes. It was concluded from the study that teacher self-fulfillment is the key to the new professionalism that is emerging and that teachers appear to be ready to be independent persons accountable for the effects they have on children.

In a California study, Richard Porter (39) attempted to identify those attitudes which best serve to explain the concept of teacher militancy, and to provide a basis for development of concise instruments for the assessment of such attitudes. A survey instrument, entitled "Classroom Teacher Point of View," was constructed to assess attitudes of teachers regarding their work environments and regarding issues commonly associated with teacher militancy, union organization, and professionalism. The self-administering survey instruments were returned by 2,178 classroom teachers in elementary and secondary schools in the 1,389 California unified school districts which had an average daily attendance greater than 4,000. Results of the survey provided a basis for defining teacher militancy as a complex of attitudes characteristically including a pronounced lack of confidence in school district administration, a general lack of support for the school principal, a cynical disbelief in the integrity of those in authority, a dissatisfaction with existing conditions of education, a strong predisposition toward educational change in general, a marked tendency to accept the processes of union organization, and an inclination to seek increased professional authority and responsibility. The respondents in the Porter (39) study felt that obtaining a beneficial collective bargaining contract is beneficial even if teachers have to go on strike to secure it. They further believed that the only way

teachers will ever become recognized as respectable professionals is by using the collective bargaining process to secure this recognition.

In a study conducted in ten school districts in Southern California, Smith and Fox (48) sought to determine the attitudes of teachers toward the negotiation procedures presently employed, and they developed an instrument to predict the level of support and desired involvement of teachers in negotiation procedures. Attitudinal data toward suggested items for negotiation were collected under four headings: (1) attitude of teachers toward the negotiation process, (2) evaluation by teachers of the negotiation process, (3) teachers' perception of the effectiveness of the negotiation process, and (4) subjects which should (or should not) be included in the negotiating process. The questionnaire contained seventy-two items--eighteen in each of the above four categories. Each item could be answered "Strongly Agree," "Agree," "Undecided," "Disagree," or "Strongly Disagree." Results of the investigation implied that teachers distinguish between two general negotiation areas: (1) professional duties, and (2) working conditions. Smith and Fox (48) concluded that teachers are most concerned that they be involved in determining items to be negotiated in the area of professional duties and demonstrate a willingness to assume a more passive role in the area of working conditions.

Kirst (29) found that teacher organizations are primarily concerned with issues of salary, promotions, and working conditions. Carlton and Goodwin (8) maintain that teachers are demanding a broad scope of negotiable items with a main thrust being a demand for equal power in formulating educational policies.

Vaughn (61) reported that in Chicago teachers are seeking a greater role in curriculum decision-making through collective bargaining. She maintains that it is only reasonable for teachers' unions to demand a greater role in developing the goals and objectives that teachers are being held responsible for implementing. Vaughn (61, p. 91) further stated:

With the advent of collective bargaining for teachers, the position once maintained by boards of education -- that curriculum matters were outside the scope of collective bargaining-- has been modified Through the collective voice of one teacher organization, designated by its members as the sole collective bargaining agent, relevant goals can be developed and changes in curriculum and programs negotiated. The result, in my opinion, will enhance the educational process and lead to the ultimate goal of quality education for all children.

Further indication of teacher interest in expanding collective bargaining to include decisions relative to curriculum and instruction comes from Lee Hansen when he says:

As teacher unions have matured, they have come to realize that instructional decisions and "working condition" decisions cannot be clearly distinguished. Any decision that impacts on a teacher in any way is seemingly fair game

for the negotiating or grievance processes. With this attitude, teachers have done much to wrest control for instructional decision making from the administration (20, p. 91).

In a study by Krey, Netzer and Eye (31, p. 470) curriculum supervisors in Wisconsin were surveyed to determine the effects of master contracts of teachers on the supervision of instruction. Several conclusions from this study follow:

1. Master contracts of teachers generally do not prohibit supervisors from nor create much interference for supervisors in fulfilling their responsibilities.
2. Supervision is perceived to be a phase of management by those negotiating master contracts.
3. Current master contracts of teachers are no great threat to curriculum supervisors.
4. System-wide curricular guides, plans, or documents still prevail as an approach to curriculum development.

Even though Krey, Netzer and Eye (31, p. 470) saw no immediate effect of master contracts of teachers on the supervision of instruction, a concluding statement to their study indicated expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining relative to the supervision of instruction:

It is recommended that supervisors be increasingly alert to additional intrusion on their function by negotiated agreements in master contracts. It is also recommended that curriculum supervisors develop their skills in adapting to provisions of master contracts of teachers. Those persons creating the master contracts need to be more fully aware of the impact of negotiated agreements on instructional program as well as on individuals employed in the school system.

A number of interesting findings relative to the actual outcomes of teacher collective bargaining were reported in a study by Booth and Carlson (5). Booth and Carlson (5) conducted their study in Illinois, a state which does not have a mandatory teacher collective bargaining law. Illinois law does permit teacher collective bargaining. Therefore, approximately one-half of the school districts in Illinois do have formal bargaining agreements with their teachers and do have written master contracts. Because of the large number of school districts both with and without formal bargaining agreements, Booth and Carlson were able to compare teacher benefits derived from bargaining verses nonbargaining districts. Following are major findings from the study (5):

1. There were no significant salary or fringe benefit differences between bargaining and nonbargaining districts.
2. Bargaining districts use legal and professional assistance in bargaining to a greater extent than nonbargaining districts.
3. The presence of a master contract increased teacher involvement in adopting a student dress code and replacing a head coach.
4. The presence of a master contract decreased teacher involvement in establishing a citizens advisory committee, adding a learning disabilities teacher, assigning curriculum committees, assigning summer school positions, adopting new textbooks, purchasing supplies or library books, agree to use of student teachers, and arranging in-service programs.

Few studies have been conducted concerning superintendents' attitudes toward any expected outcomes of teacher militancy as it relates to teacher collective bargaining. One such study, conducted in 1970 by John Stuckey (52), was done among superintendents in Oregon. These superintendents represented a non-probability sample of fifteen superintendents selected from forty-eight superintendents who had identified themselves as most disturbed and concerned about teacher militancy on a mailed Feelings Inventory. Each of the fifteen superintendents was interviewed to provide more information about his feelings and views.

Analysis of the interview responses to questions dealing with administrative authority revealed that ninety-three per cent of the superintendents viewed teacher militancy to be threatening the authority and influence of superintendents. The role of the superintendent was seen by ninety-three per cent of the sample population to be changing because of teacher militancy. Administrative authority, labor-management tactics, teacher relationships, and types of leadership styles were identified as changing and affecting the role of the superintendent. Stuckey (52) found that most superintendents (87%) in his study were upset because they viewed their actual role in teacher collective bargaining as inconsistent with their preferred role. The superintendents were also upset because they saw teacher organizations, such as the American Federation

of Teachers and the National Education Association, as straying from the profession.

Changes resulting from teacher militancy were viewed by eighty-seven per cent of the superintendents in the Stuckey study (52) as increasing their work load and problems. Every superintendent interviewed predicted that teacher militancy would have an impact on education. This impact was seen as involving local control, teacher unions, professionalism, and public support of education. The superintendents were pessimistic about this impact and indicated harmful consequences could result. Perhaps the following comments by one of the superintendents best summarized the feelings of the superintendents in the Stuckey (52, p. 26) study:

The thing that most disturbs me is that there is the school board, school superintendent, and taxpayers on the one hand, and the teachers on the other hand who say 'we are going to have these things right now.' This is the greatest problem I've seen. Teachers want to change things immediately--without any concern for anybody else, including children.

It is not clear from the above studies what the actual outcomes, relative to superintendents, will be as a result of teacher collective bargaining. One thing is apparent, however, and that is that superintendents do expect their traditional roles to change as a result of teacher collective bargaining. Taylor (53, p. 17) stated:

When boards of education yield to the teachers' demands and adopt negotiating procedures, the traditional board-administrator-teacher relationship becomes ill-adopted.

Rhodes (40, p. 112) felt that the superintendent could best serve in the capacity of advisor to both parties--the board of education and the teachers' organization. In expressing his view he said:

I mean that he should not be the school board's representative in the bargaining sessions with teachers. He can be a consultant or advisor to the board and he can work closely . . . with the teachers. But a superintendent gets into too many difficulties in direct bargaining. He simply isn't in a position to be a tough labor boss one night and show up at his office the next morning as the instructional leader (40, p. 112).

Ball (3, p. 70) suggested a major outcome, as far as superintendents are concerned, of teacher collective bargaining when he said:

To be successful in this new activity, the superintendent must change his mind on one item that has often obsessed him in the past, and that is that 'everything goes through me.' The old idea of the superintendent as a person who possesses all wisdom and has to keep his fingers on every detail of every phase of the operation simply will not work in the field of bargaining. Here, in a sense, the superintendent is no longer central. The focal groups involved are the teachers on one hand and the public, on the other. When the chips are down, there will only be these two groups involved in the bargaining and it is they who will make the final decision.

While there were no studies concerning board members' expected outcomes apparent in the literature, there were some opinions. Hedding (22) expressed a view reportedly held by

many board members when he said that school officials have no right to allow collective bargaining to constrain or impinge upon the educational opportunities to be provided to children. Heddinger (22) also observed that many board members do not feel that bargaining agents who represent teachers represent children or the general public. Wyatt (62, p. 101) contended that, ". . . the board of the future will be divested of its traditional authority, autonomy, and paternalism."

Perry and Wildman (38, p. 216) conceptualized the most basic outcome of teacher collective bargaining where school boards are concerned when they stated:

In the absence of a collective bargaining relationship, policy formulation and implementation in a local school district is a de facto legislative process. Although a board of education enjoys a legal right to make final decisions on policy, this right is qualified by the political need to consider and accommodate, to some extent, the views of various constituent groups. Thus, in practice, decision making by a board can be viewed as a process in which a board of education serves to mediate possibly conflicting interests among the following types of groups: (1) taxpayers; (2) parents; (3) civil rights organizations; (4) school administrators; (5) classroom teachers; and (6) board members themselves.

Collective bargaining is essentially a bilateral decision-making process. It requires that a board of education achieve a consensus among all interest groups but teachers and then defend that consensus against a consensus among teachers as developed and articulated by a teacher organization. As a result, a board of education and school management engaged in bargaining must often abandon its neutral role of mediator and assume an active role as adversary to teachers.

Clement (9) felt that one of the outcomes of teacher collective bargaining would be that many of the best people will no longer seek positions on boards of education and that their places will be taken by politicians who are adept at bargaining but have little concept of what good education is and what is best for schools and children.

In a search for further information relative to the long-range instructional and noninstructional outcomes of teacher collective bargaining, the researcher was unable to find a great deal more empirical information. School board association representatives in several states with long histories of teacher collective bargaining were contacted. Information from George Tipler (59), Wisconsin Association of School Boards, Inc., indicated that school board turnover is approximately twice as fast as it was before the implementation of a mandatory bargaining law in 1972. Tipler (59) also indicated that the relationship between teachers, superintendents and board members has become more adversarial since 1972, and that the public has taken a more negative view of teachers since the implementation of teacher collective bargaining. Information from the New Jersey School Boards Association revealed that teachers have obtained higher salaries and fringe benefits via the negotiations process.

Anthony Pascal and Lorraine McDonnell (37) of The Rand Corporation's Policy Research Center in Educational Finance and

Governance have recently contracted with the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, to do a five year longitudinal study on the effects of teacher collective bargaining. Included in this study will be an attempt to determine the long-range effects of teacher collective bargaining on class size provisions, teacher evaluation, professional growth and in-service, use of aides and specialists, and teacher participation in textbook selection and curriculum review.

In summary, the literature seemed to indicate that boards of education and administrators in general feel that teacher collective bargaining will be detrimental to the educational process. Kowalczyk (30) perhaps best summed up the feelings of boards of education and superintendents when he said that collective bargaining leads to a relationship between board and association in which the association is challenging the board's assumed autonomy--its exclusive right to determine all instructional policies. This leads to an adversarial relationship. Teachers and teacher associations on the other hand feel that adversary relationships can be productive and wholesome.

According to Herndon (24), one point seems certain concerning the expected outcomes of collective bargaining by teachers: disputes between teachers and school boards are going to shift from wages and working conditions to control of

educational policy. Both national teacher associations, the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association, agree on this key point for the future.

Conclusions

The current slogan of teacher organizations across America might well coincide with that of an equally timely slogan for a women's cigarette commercial, "You've come a long way, Baby." In just shortly over fifty years the public employees collective bargaining movement has progressed from the actual outlawing of union membership to full collective bargaining, binding arbitration, and in some cases, legalized public employee (including teachers) strikes.

Certainly, as other states enact collective bargaining statutes, even more deliberate steps will be taken to insure teachers and other employees the same rights in securing increased wages and improved working conditions as those enjoyed by employees in the private sector of our economy. It seems apparent from the review of literature that many state legislatures have made an effort over the past few years to insure teachers of the right to bargain collectively. In states where teacher collective bargaining has been in existence for several years, it appears that only recently has anyone attempted to determine the long-range instructional and noninstructional outcomes.

It is apparent that people associated with public education in Iowa are experiencing the dawning of a new era in the public employee-employer relationship. The boys and girls of Iowa will certainly be the beneficiaries if the principal parties in the teacher collective bargaining process can examine their long-range expected outcomes now rather than after the fact, as has happened in other states.

CHAPTER III. METHODS AND PROCEDURES

The major purpose of this investigation was to gather data so as to determine if there were significant differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act between and among groups of randomly selected Iowa teachers, superintendents, and board members. These data were gathered by the administration of a survey via the U.S. mail to randomly selected Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members.

The Development of the Questionnaire

A part of the survey called for the following specific information: sex, number of years in teaching, and whether the financial remuneration received from teaching is a primary or secondary source of family income from the teacher respondents; years of experience as a superintendent from the superintendent respondents; and whether the school district of which the respondent is a part has a formal teacher bargaining unit.

The bulk of the survey, however, called for responses on a five point Likert scale to a number of "expected outcome" statements. Through the review of literature and assistance from an Iowa State University graduate class in Administration

of School Personnel, the list of seventy-five "expected outcome" statements was developed. The respondents were asked to react to each expected outcome statement with "strongly agree," "agree," "neutral," "disagree," or "strongly disagree."

The first draft of the questionnaire was submitted to the following persons for review and suggestions:

Ross Engel: Professor of Education Administration
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa

William Halverson: Superintendent of Schools
Newton Community Schools, Newton, Iowa

William Freese: Chief Negotiator for Board
Newton Community Schools, Newton, Iowa

Doug Meinhart: Chief Negotiator for the Newton Education
Association
Newton Community Schools, Newton, Iowa

Their suggestions were incorporated into a refined form of the questionnaire used in the pilot study.

The Pilot Study

A pilot test of the instrument and statistical analysis was conducted through the cooperation of Dr. Anton Netusil of Iowa State University; and twenty-five elementary teachers, twenty-five secondary teachers, five superintendents and ten board members selected from five school districts from which teachers, superintendents, and board members were not to be selected for the final administration of the questionnaire.

After the pilot questionnaires were returned, suggestions provided by the respondents were incorporated into a revised

form of the questionnaire to improve content and clarity.

The investigator applied the statistical analysis described later in this chapter to the pilot data to determine the appropriateness of the selected analyses.

Selection of the Sample

Selection of the study sample of teachers, superintendents, and board members was made from the population of teachers, superintendents, and board members of Iowa's twenty-five largest and twenty-five smallest school districts. A sample of twenty-five board members, twenty-five superintendents and 300 teachers were systematically selected using an alphabetized list of board members, superintendents, and teachers from each of the two groups of twenty-five school districts to select every nth name on the lists. It was believed that the size of that sample would yield sufficient numbers of persons with each of the demographic characteristics to be analyzed so as to provide an accurate representation of the population.

Collection of the Data

A total of 700 questionnaires were mailed to the selected sample of teachers, superintendents, and board members in Iowa's twenty-five largest and twenty-five smallest school districts. Following a two week period for the initial mailing to have been completed and returned, a follow-up letter with

another copy of the questionnaire was mailed to those persons who had not yet responded. Two weeks after the second mailing, post card reminders were sent to those persons who had still not responded. Since a total of sixty-nine percent of those who were initially selected for the study sample had responded following the third mailing, no further follow-up was done.

Treatment of the Data

The data collected through the questionnaire was categorized into cells according to size of district and the respondents' school roles. Additional categorization of the data was made according to the following demographic characteristics of the respondents: teacher sex, whether the financial remuneration the teachers receive from teaching is a primary or secondary source of family income, years of experience in present job role for superintendents and teachers, and whether the school district had a formal teacher bargaining unit at the time of the administration of the survey.

The seventy-five "expected outcome" statements were categorized into ten scales as shown in Appendix C. The ten scales are: (1) Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations, (2) Board Power, (3) Job Satisfaction, (4) Salaries-Fringes, (5) Instructional Implications, (6) Teacher Input, (7) Public Opinion, (8) Working Conditions, (9) Budget, and (10) Political Involvement. Pearson Correlation coefficients were computed

for each "expected outcome" statement to determine that item's correlation to its assigned scale and to every other scale. All items correlated to their assigned scale at the .001 significance level.

Using the aforementioned scales, the data was then analyzed using the following parametric statistical treatments. Mean scores were computed for each of the comparison groups on each of the scales by assigning a value of 1 to the "strongly agree" response, a value of 2 to the "agree" response, a value of 3 to the "neutral" response, a value of 4 to the "disagree" response, and a value of 5 to the "strongly disagree" response. An analysis of variance was then conducted and the F-ratio was used to test the following hypotheses:

1. There are no differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act between the groups of Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members.
2. There are no differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among groups of Iowa teachers, superintendents, and board members in the twenty-five largest pupil enrollment school districts, except Des Moines, as compared to those from the twenty-five smallest pupil enrollment school districts.

3. There are no differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among Iowa elementary and secondary teachers relative to their differences in number of years of teaching experience.
4. There are no differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among Iowa elementary and secondary teachers relative to whether they are male or female.
5. There are no differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among Iowa teachers relative to whether the financial remuneration they receive from teaching is a primary or secondary source of family income.
6. There are no differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among Iowa teachers, superintendents, and board members in the study relative to whether or not the school district of which they are a part has a formal teacher bargaining unit.
7. There are no differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among superintendents in the

study relative to their differences in total years of experience as a school superintendent.

Duncan's Multiple Range Test of homogenous subsets was then used to determine which group means for each scale were significantly different from the other group means for each of the above null hypotheses where more than two groups were being compared.

Summary

This chapter explained the major purpose and step-by-step procedure of the study in detail. The development of the questionnaire and the planned pilot study were described. The characteristics of the subjects in the sample were outlined and the method of the sample selection was detailed. The methods of data collection and treatment were reviewed.

CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS

The major purpose of this investigation was to gather data so as to determine if there were significant differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional long-range outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act as stated in the null hypotheses listed in the previous chapter. Following the collection of data, the statistical analyses described in the previous chapter were conducted. The findings of those analyses, relative to the specific hypotheses of the study, are herein reported.

Profile of the Respondents

The profile of teacher respondents indicates a total of 405 teachers responded to the questionnaire. The teachers were asked to indicate whether they are elementary (K-6) or secondary (7-12) teachers, whether their school district has a formal bargaining unit, their sex, total number of years of teaching experience, the size of school district in which they teach, and whether their teaching salary is a primary or secondary source of family income. Table 1 illustrates the number and percent of teachers indicating each variable.

A total of forty-one superintendents responded to the survey. The superintendents were asked to indicate their total number of years of experience as a superintendent, whether their school district has a formal bargaining unit, and the

Table 1. Profile of teacher respondents

Variables	Number	Percent of teacher respondents
Position		
Elementary (K-6)	177	43.7
Secondary (7-12)	228	56.3
Bargaining unit		
Yes	275	67.9
No	130	32.1
Sex		
Male	140	34.6
Female	265	65.4
District size		
Twenty-five smallest	197	48.6
Twenty-five largest	208	51.4
Teaching experience		
0-5 years	116	28.6
6-10 years	89	22.0
11-15 years	65	16.0
16-20 years	48	11.9
More than 20 years	87	21.5
Teaching salary		
Primary source of family income	285	70.4
Secondary source of family income	120	29.6

size of school district in which they are superintendent.

Table 2 illustrates the number and per cent of superintendents indicating each variable.

A total of thirty-four board members responded to the survey. The board members were asked to indicate whether their school district has a bargaining unit and the size of school district in which they are a board member. Table 3 illustrates the number and per cent of board members indicating each variable.

Table 2. Profile of superintendent respondents

Variables	Number	Percent of superintendent respondents
District size		
Twenty-five smallest	16	39.0
Twenty-five largest	25	61.0
Bargaining unit		
Yes	28	68.3
No	13	31.7
Superintendent experience		
0-5 years	14	34.1
6-10 years	4	9.8
11-15 years	7	17.1
16-20 years	5	12.2
More than 20 years	11	26.8

Table 3. Profile of board member respondents

Variables	Number	Percent of board member respondents
District size		
Twenty-five smallest	11	32.4
Twenty-five largest	23	67.6
Bargaining unit		
Yes	27	79.4
No	7	20.6

Hypothesis Number One

There are no significant differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act between and among groups of Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members.

The analysis of variance was used to determine the significance of the mean differences between the groups on each of the scales as shown in Appendix C and are reported in Table 4.

When reading and interpreting all tables in the remainder of Chapter IV, it must be remembered that mean scores were computed by assigning a value of 1 to the "strongly agree" response, a value of 2 to the "agree" response, a value of 3 to the "neutral" response, a value of 4 to the "disagree"

Table 4. Tests for significant differences between the groups by position with respect to the expected instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on each of the scales

Scales	Elementary teachers (n=177)	Secondary teachers (n=228)	Superintendents (n=41)	Board members (n=34)	F ratio
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	3.0871	2.9851	3.9900	3.9515	64.704**
Board Power	2.8314	2.7485	1.9837	2.2059	48.069**
Job Satisfaction	3.2308	3.3599	2.2300	2.4328	57.831**
Salary-Fringes	2.7344	2.5077	2.5793	2.7647	4.049*
Instruction	2.9812	2.8188	3.8055	3.7189	44.824**
Teacher Input	3.1537	3.1636	3.3400	3.2647	1.407
Public Opinion	3.1965	3.1244	4.2800	4.0823	50.135**
Working Conditions	2.5289	2.3425	2.3994	2.5341	5.933*
Budget	2.7500	2.6586	2.6500	2.4853	1.796
Political Involvement	2.2105	2.1894	1.6159	1.8603	18.115**

*Significant at the .05 level.

**Significant at the .01 level.

response, and a value of 5 to the "strongly disagree" response. On the scale Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations in Table 4, for example, secondary teachers had an expected instructional and noninstructional outcome mean score of 2.9851 and superintendents had a mean score of 3.9900. The secondary teachers' mean score should be interpreted as indicating slight agreement that teacher-superintendent/board relations will be improved as a result of teacher collective bargaining. The superintendents' mean score indicates disagreement that teacher-superintendent/board relations will be improved as a result of teacher collective bargaining. All expected instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores in the tables indicating F-ratios and those indicating Duncan's Multiple Range Test in the remainder of this chapter should be interpreted in the above manner.

Only on the scales of questions relative to Teacher Input and Budget were there no significant differences between the groups, therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Differences in mean scores between the groups on the Salaries-Fringes scale were significant at the .05 level and the null hypothesis was rejected. Differences in mean scores between the groups on all other scales were significant at the .01 level and the null hypothesis was rejected.

The Duncan Multiple Range Test was used to determine which of the forty differences between the group means were

significant and which were not. These results are reported in Table 5.

On the Duncan Multiple Range Test of homogenous subsets it was found that for the scales Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations and Public Opinion there was not a significant difference at the .05 level between the groups of elementary teachers and secondary teachers nor between superintendents and board members. There was a significant difference in the mean scores at the .05 level between the subsets elementary-secondary teachers and superintendents-board members.

For the scales Board Power and Political Involvement, there was no significant difference at the .05 level between the means of the groups of elementary teachers and secondary teachers. There were significant differences at the .05 level between the means of the groups of superintendents, board members and the subset of elementary-secondary teachers.

For the scales Job Satisfaction and Instruction, there was no significant difference at the .05 level between the means of the groups of superintendents and board members, however, there were significant differences at the .05 level between the means of the groups of elementary teachers, secondary teachers, and the subset of superintendents-board members.

For the scale Working Conditions, there were no significant differences at the .05 level in the means of the groups

Table 5. Duncan's Multiple Range Test to determine which group means were significantly different where elementary teachers = Group 1; secondary teachers = Group 2; superintendents = Group 3; and board members = Group 4

Scales	Group means in ranges from smallest to largest*			
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	Group 2 <u>2.9851</u>	Group 1 <u>3.0871</u>	Group 4 <u>3.9515</u>	Group 3 <u>3.9900</u>
Board Power	Group 3 1.9837	Group 4 2.2059	Group 2 <u>2.7485</u>	Group 1 <u>2.8314</u>
Job Satisfaction	Group 3 <u>2.2300</u>	Group 4 <u>2.4328</u>	Group 1 3.2308	Group 2 3.3599
Instruction	Group 2 2.8188	Group 1 2.9812	Group 4 <u>3.7189</u>	Group 3 <u>3.8055</u>
Public Opinion	Group 2 <u>3.1244</u>	Group 1 <u>3.1965</u>	Group 4 <u>4.0823</u>	Group 3 <u>4.2800</u>
Working Conditions	Group 2 <u>2.3425</u>	Group 3 <u>2.3994</u>	Group 1 2.5289	Group 4 2.5341
Budget	Group 4 <u>2.4853</u>	Group 3 <u>2.6500</u>	Group 2 2.6586	Group 1 2.7500
Political Involvement	Group 3 1.6159	Group 4 1.8603	Group 2 <u>2.1894</u>	Group 1 <u>2.2105</u>

* Any group means not underscored by the same line are significantly different at the .05 level. Any means underscored by the same line are not significantly different at the .05 level.

of secondary teachers and superintendents nor between the means of the groups of superintendents, elementary teachers, and board members. There was a significant difference at the .05 level between the means of the subsets secondary teachers-superintendents and superintendents-elementary teachers-board members.

For the scale Budget, there were no significant differences at the .05 level in the means of the groups of board members, superintendents and secondary teachers nor between the means of the group of superintendents, secondary teachers, and elementary teachers. There was a significant difference at the .05 level between the means of the subset board members-superintendents-secondary teachers and subset superintendents-secondary teachers-elementary teachers. As was indicated in Table 4, there were no significant differences at the .05 level between the groups of elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members on the scales Teacher Input and Salaries-Fringes.

Hypothesis Number Two

There are no significant differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among groups of teachers, superintendents, and board members in the twenty-five largest pupil enrollment school districts, except Des Moines, as compared to those in the twenty-five smallest pupil enrollment school districts.

The analysis of variance was used to determine the mean differences between teachers in large districts and those in small districts on each of the scales and are reported in Table 6.

Only on the scales of questions relative to Salaries-Fringes, Working Conditions, and Political Involvement were there significant differences at the .05 level between the mean responses of teachers in large districts and those in small districts and the null hypothesis was rejected. The mean differences were significant at the .01 level on the scales Salaries-Fringes and Political Involvement. Differences in mean scores between the groups of teachers in small districts and those in large districts on all other scales were not significant at the .05 level and the null hypothesis was not rejected.

The analysis of variance was used to determine the significance of the mean differences between superintendents in large districts and those in small districts on each of the scales and are reported in Table 7.

Mean differences between small district superintendents and large district superintendents were significant at the .05 level only on the scales Instruction, Teacher Input, and Political Involvement. The null hypothesis was rejected on these three scales. The null hypothesis was not rejected on all other scales since there was not a significant difference

Table 6. Tests for significant differences between teachers in large districts and those in small districts with respect to the expected instructional and non-instructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales

Scales	Small district teachers (n=197)	Large district teachers (n=208)	F ratio
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	3.0567	3.0048	0.854
Board Power	2.8086	2.7626	0.982
Job Satisfaction	3.2530	3.3512	2.572
Salaries-Fringes	2.7270	2.4927	11.970**
Instruction	2.9165	2.8640	0.673
Teacher Input	3.1451	3.1730	0.261
Public Opinion	3.1867	3.1264	0.742
Working Conditions	2.4981	2.3504	9.702*
Budget	2.7183	2.6796	0.346
Political Involvement	2.2982	2.1039	14.555**

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

Table 7. Tests for significant differences between superintendents in large districts and those in small districts with respect to the expected instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales

Scales	Small district superintendents (n=16)	Large district superintendents (n=25)	F ratio
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	3.8969	4.0521	1.994
Board Power	2.0104	1.9667	0.085
Job Satisfaction	2.2143	2.2400	0.030
Salaries-Fringes	2.5156	2.6200	0.154
Instruction	3.6181	3.9305	4.233*
Teacher Input	2.9937	3.5708	6.462*
Public Opinion	4.3000	4.2667	0.056
Working Conditions	2.4609	2.3600	0.412
Budget	2.7813	2.5625	1.280
Political Involvement	1.8438	1.4700	5.050*

* Significant at the .05 level.

at the .05 level between the mean responses of superintendents in large districts and those in small districts.

The analysis of variance was used to determine the differences between the mean responses of board members in large districts as compared to those in small districts and is reported in Table 8.

The small district board members' responses did differ significantly from large district board members on the Teacher Input and Public Opinion scales. There were no significant differences in responses between the two groups on the other eight scales.

Hypothesis Number Three

There are no differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among Iowa elementary and secondary teachers relative to their differences in number of years of teaching experience.

The analysis of variance was used to determine the mean differences on each of the ten expected outcome scales among elementary teachers relative to their differences in number of years of teaching experience. These are reported in Table 9.

Mean differences of expected outcome scores among the elementary teachers in the study when compared relative to years of teaching experience were not significant on seven of the ten scales and the null hypothesis was not rejected. However, on three of the scales, Teacher-Superintendent/Board

Table 8. Tests for significant differences between board members from small districts as compared to those from large districts with respect to the expected instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales

Scales	Small district board members (n=11)	Large district board members (n=23)	F ratio
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	3.9227	3.9652	0.049
Board Power	2.2576	2.1812	0.116
Job Satisfaction	2.4026	2.4472	0.035
Salaries-Fringes	2.5909	2.8478	0.855
Instruction	3.4949	3.8261	3.116
Teacher Input	2.6000	3.5826	17.192**
Public Opinion	3.8000	4.2174	4.591*
Working Conditions	2.3875	2.5978	3.310
Budget	2.4091	2.5217	0.221
Political Involvement	2.1364	1.7283	3.594

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

Table 9. Tests for significant differences between groups of elementary teachers relative to their differences in number of years of teaching experience with respect to the expected instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales

Scales	0-5 years (n=43)	5-10 years (n=39)	11-15 years (n=25)	16-20 years (n=31)	20+ years (n=39)	F ratio
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	2.7942	3.0703	3.3180	3.2578	3.1395	4.326**
Board Power	2.9031	2.8246	2.8467	2.6771	2.8761	1.100
Job Satisfaction	3.4120	3.2782	3.0457	3.0714	3.2344	1.983
Salaries-Fringes	2.6105	2.6776	3.0000	2.7656	2.7303	1.214
Instruction	2.7519	2.9854	3.2176	3.0963	2.9970	2.159
Teacher Input	3.0233	3.2184	3.2913	3.2125	3.1027	1.212
Public Opinion	2.8977	3.0947	3.4080	3.2903	3.4210	3.665**
Working Conditions	2.5669	2.4178	2.7604	2.4718	2.4966	1.701
Budget	2.7442	2.9211	2.7000	2.6290	2.7179	0.866
Political Involvement	2.4419	2.1316	2.1500	2.1484	2.1218	2.873*

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

Relations, Public Opinion, and Political Involvement, there was a significant difference in the mean responses among the experience groups of elementary teachers.

The Duncan Multiple Range Test of homogenous subsets, reported in Table 10, indicates which experience group subsets on each of the three scales with significant differences were significantly different from the other experience group subsets. On all three scales, the group of elementary teachers with less than five years of experience was the experience group which indicated a significant difference in expected outcome mean scores.

As Table 11 indicates, few differences were noted among the secondary teachers when mean scores of the experience groups were compared using the analysis of variance. Only on the scales of Job Satisfaction and Public Opinion was there a significant mean score difference at the .05 level between the experience groups.

Table 12 shows the results of the Duncan Multiple Range Test for the two scales in which there were significant differences between the mean scores of the subsets of experience groups. On the scale of Job Satisfaction the secondary teachers in the experience group with more than twenty years experience had a significantly different mean score than teachers in the other experience groups. On the Public Opinion scale, the Duncan's Test showed three subsets of experience

Table 10. Duncan's Multiple Range Test of experience group means among elementary teachers on three scales with significant expected outcome mean scores where elementary teachers with 0-5 years experience = Group 1; 6-10 years = Group 2; 11-15 years = Group 3; 16-20 years = Group 4; and 20 or more years = Group 5

Scales	Group means in ranges from smallest to largest*				
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	Group 1 2.7942	Group 2 <u>3.0703</u>	Group 5 3.1395	Group 4 3.2578	Group 3 <u>3.3180</u>
Public Opinion	Group 1 <u>2.8977</u>	Group 2 <u>3.0947</u>	Group 4 3.2903	Group 3 3.4080	Group 5 <u>3.4210</u>
Political Involvement	Group 5 <u>2.1218</u>	Group 2 2.1316	Group 4 2.1484	Group 3 <u>2.1500</u>	Group 1 2.4419

* Any group means not underscored by the same line are significantly different at the .05 level. Any group means underscored by the same line are not significantly different at the .05 level.

Table 11. Tests for significant differences between groups of secondary teachers relative to their differences in number of years of teaching experience with respect to the expected instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales

Scales	0-5 years (n=73)	6-10 years (n=50)	11-15 years (n=40)	16-20 years (n=17)	20+ years (n=48)	F ratio
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	2.9627	2.9245	2.8692	3.1687	3.1244	2.159
Board Power	2.7014	2.8300	2.7375	2.8437	2.7101	0.918
Job Satisfaction	3.3953	3.4734	3.4725	3.2857	3.1190	3.040*
Salaries-Fringes	2.3715	2.6520	2.5577	2.7031	2.4531	2.038
Instruction	2.6895	2.7846	2.8918	2.9259	2.9622	1.988
Teacher Input	3.0479	3.2882	3.1744	3.1750	3.1957	1.645
Public Opinion	2.9889	3.0200	3.2769	3.5125	3.1833	3.129*
Working Conditions	2.2688	2.4681	2.2949	2.2969	2.3750	2.082
Budget	2.5959	2.7451	2.5897	2.8750	2.6458	1.020
Political Involvement	2.1952	2.2794	2.0769	2.0625	2.2188	1.136

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

Table 12. Duncan's Multiple Range Test of experience group means among secondary teachers on two scales with significant expected outcome mean scores where secondary teachers with 0-5 years experience = Group 1; 6-10 years = Group 2; 11-15 years = Group 3; 16-20 years = Group 4; and 20 or more years = Group 5

Scales	Group means in ranges from smallest to largest*				
Job Satisfaction	Group 5 <u>3.1190</u>	Group 4 <u>3.2857</u>	Group 1 3.3953	Group 3 3.4725	Group 2 3.4734
Public Opinion	Group 1 <u>2.9889</u>	Group 2 <u>3.0200</u>	Group 5 <u>3.1833</u>	Group 3 3.2769	Group 4 3.5125

* Any group means not underscored by the same line are significantly different at the .05 level. Any group means underscored by the same line are not significantly different at the .05 level.

groups with similar mean scores with the most significant difference being between teachers with less than five years of teaching experience and those with sixteen to twenty years of experience.

Hypothesis Number Four

There are no differences in the expected outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among Iowa elementary and secondary teachers relative to whether they are male or female.

Using the analysis of variance with the F scale, it was determined that there were no significant differences among the mean scores of elementary teachers relative to their differences in sex or among secondary teachers relative to their differences in sex. The comparison of mean differences and F ratios for each of the scales are shown for elementary teachers and secondary teachers in Tables 13 and 14 respectively. The null hypothesis was not rejected.

Hypothesis Number Five

There are no differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among Iowa teachers relative to whether the financial remuneration they receive from teaching is a primary or secondary source of family income.

The analysis of variance with the F ratio was used to test for differences between the expected outcome mean scores of teachers whose financial remuneration for teaching is a primary

Table 13. Tests for significant differences among elementary teachers relative to their differences in sex with respect to the expected instructional and non-instructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales

Scales	Male (n=11)	Female (n=166)	F ratio
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	3.1864	3.0804	0.306
Board Power	3.0909	2.8142	3.284
Job Satisfaction	3.1039	3.2392	0.464
Salaries-Fringes	2.4545	2.7530	1.728
Instruction	3.1556	2.9705	0.677
Teacher Input	3.3182	3.1425	1.001
Public Opinion	3.4182	3.1817	1.057
Working Conditions	2.4545	2.5339	0.221
Budget	2.7727	2.7485	0.012
Political Involvement	2.2045	2.2108	0.003

Table 14. Tests for significant differences among secondary teachers relative to their differences in sex with respect to the expected instructional and non-instructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales

Scales	Males (n=129)	Female (n=99)	F ratio
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	2.9859	2.9840	0.000
Board Power	2.7900	2.6941	2.627
Job Satisfaction	3.3510	3.3717	0.067
Salaries-Fringes	2.5291	2.4794	0.335
Instruction	2.8463	2.7813	0.682
Teacher Input	3.1899	3.1288	0.735
Public Opinion	3.1250	3.1237	0.000
Working Conditions	2.3624	2.3163	0.703
Budget	2.6279	2.6990	0.712
Political Involvement	2.1473	2.2449	2.000

source of family income and those for which it is a secondary source of family income. As Table 15 shows, there were no significant differences in mean scores at the .05 level on nine of the ten scales. On those nine scales, Hypothesis Number Five, could not be rejected. However, on the scale of expected outcome statements relative to Budget, there was a significant difference between mean scores of teachers whose salary from teaching is a primary source of family income and those for which it is not. The null hypothesis was rejected for the Budget scale.

Hypothesis Number Six

There are no differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among Iowa teachers, superintendents, and board members in the study relative to whether or not the school district of which they are a part has a formal teacher bargaining unit.

The Iowa Public Employment Relations Act has given teachers in Iowa the right to bargain collectively with school boards since July 1, 1975. While teachers in a majority of the school districts in Iowa have elected to be recognized as formal bargaining units by the Public Employment Relations Board and bargain collectively with their boards of education, there are still a considerable number of Iowa school districts where the majority of the teachers have remained content to resolve their conditions of employment by means other than

Table 15. Tests for significant differences among Iowa teachers relative to whether the financial remuneration they receive from teaching is a primary or secondary source of family income with respect to the expected instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales

Scales	Teaching salary		F ratio
	Primary source of family income (n=285)	Secondary source of family income (n=120)	
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	3.0014	3.0995	2.552
Board Power	2.8090	2.7291	2.478
Job Satisfaction	3.3378	3.2208	3.030
Salaries-Fringes	2.5775	2.6780	1.781
Instruction	2.8500	2.9846	3.706
Teacher Input	3.1460	3.1914	0.575
Public Opinion	3.1180	3.2478	2.869
Working Conditions	2.4014	2.4763	2.016
Budget	2.6474	2.8220	5.949*
Political Involvement	2.1675	2.2731	3.476

* Significant at the .05 level.

those delineated under the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act.

Of the twenty-five large pupil enrollment districts in the study, the teachers in each of the districts had elected to form a bargaining unit and bargain collectively according to the provisions of the teacher collective bargaining law. Teachers in the twenty-five small pupil enrollment districts in the investigation were less inclined to adopt the formal collective bargaining procedures of the Public Employment Relations Act. Teachers in only four of the twenty-five small pupil enrollment districts had elected to bargain formally under the provisions of the Public Employment Relations Act.

Hypothesis Number Six was tested using the analysis of variance for each of the ten expected outcome scales. Mean responses and F ratios among teachers from bargaining and non-bargaining school districts are shown in Table 16.

Differences in mean scores on seven of the ten expected outcome scales were found to be significant at the .05 level or greater. Most notably, differences on mean scales between bargaining and nonbargaining teachers on three of the expected outcome scales were significant at the .01 level. On all seven of these expected outcome scales, Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations, Board Power, Job Satisfaction, Salaries-Fringes, Teacher Input, Working Conditions, and Political Involvement, the null hypothesis was rejected. On the expected outcome

Table 16. Tests for significant differences between teachers from bargaining and non-bargaining districts with respect to the expected instructional and non-instructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales

Scales	With a formal teacher bargaining unit (n=275)	Without a formal teacher bargaining unit (n=130)	F ratio
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	2.9746	3.1480	8.495**
Board Power	2.7170	2.8173	4.088*
Job Satisfaction	3.1483	3.3769	12.488**
Salaries-Fringes	2.5311	2.7674	10.582**
Instruction	2.8622	2.9475	1.557
Teacher Input	3.2003	3.0726	4.824*
Public Opinion	3.1114	3.2496	3.435
Working Conditions	2.3889	2.4942	4.272*
Budget	2.6960	2.7038	0.012
Political Involvement	2.1578	2.2846	5.290*

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

scales of Instruction, Public Opinion, and Budget the investigation was unable to reject the null hypothesis for teachers.

Mean responses and F ratios for each of the ten expected outcome scales between groups of superintendents from bargaining and nonbargaining school districts are shown in Table 17.

Differences in mean scores between superintendents from bargaining and nonbargaining districts appear to be less divergent than between teachers from bargaining and nonbargaining districts. Significant differences in mean scores between the two groups of superintendents were at the .05 level on three of the scales and at the .01 level on one scale. The investigation was unable to reject the null hypothesis on each of the other six expected outcome scales.

Even fewer differences were noted between the mean scores of board members from bargaining and nonbargaining school districts. Table 18 shows that the null hypothesis was able to be rejected on one of the expected outcome scales, Teacher Input, when the mean responses of the two groups of board members were compared. The investigation of board members mean responses on each of the nine remaining scales failed to reject the null hypothesis.

Table 17. Tests for significant differences between superintendents from bargaining and nonbargaining districts with respect to the expected instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales

Scales	With a formal teacher bargaining unit (n=28)	Without a formal teacher bargaining unit (n=13)	F ratio
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	4.0704	3.8231	4.974*
Board Power	1.9345	2.0897	0.995
Job Satisfaction	2.1990	2.2967	0.398
Salaries-Fringes	2.5982	2.5385	0.046
Instruction	3.9218	3.5641	5.183*
Teacher Input	3.4815	3.0461	3.108
Public Opinion	4.3185	4.2000	0.655
Working Conditions	2.3036	2.6058	3.636
Budget	2.5185	2.9231	4.309*
Political Involvement	1.4464	1.9808	10.570**

* Significant at the .05 level.

** Significant at the .01 level.

Table 18. Tests for significant differences between board members from bargaining and nonbargaining districts with respect to the expected instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales

Scales	With a formal teacher bargaining unit (n=28)	Without a formal teacher bargaining unit (n=7)	F ratio
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	3.9518	3.9500	0.0
Board Power	2.1790	2.3095	0.254
Job Satisfaction	2.4286	2.4490	0.005
Salaries-Fringes	2.8056	2.6071	0.375
Instruction	3.7737	3.5079	1.427
Teacher Input	3.4593	2.5143	10.186**
Public Opinion	4.1185	3.9429	0.540
Working Conditions	2.5721	2.3929	1.820
Budget	2.5185	2.3571	0.341
Political Involvement	1.7685	2.2143	3.165

** Significant at the .01 level.

Hypothesis Number Seven

There are no significant differences in the expected instructional and noninstructional outcomes of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act among superintendents in the study relative to their differences in total years of experience as a school superintendent.

The forty-one superintendents included in the investigation represented a broad range of years of experience in the superintendency. The null hypothesis relative to the mean differences on each of the expected outcome scales between groups of superintendents with varying lengths of superintendent experience was unable to be rejected for nine of ten scales. Only on the expected outcome scale Job Satisfaction, was there a significant difference in mean scores at the .05 level among the superintendents and the null hypothesis was rejected.

The results of the Duncan's Multiple Range Test shown in Table 20 show that on the Job Satisfaction scale the homogeneous subset of superintendent experience groups including superintendents with 20 or more, 16-20, 11-15, and 6-10 years of experience were significantly different from the homogeneous subset composed of superintendent experience groups including superintendents with 11-15, 6-10, and 0-5 years of experience. Even though the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act was implemented only two years ago, the investigation indicates that superintendents with comparatively long amounts of

Table 19. Tests for significant differences among superintendents relative to years of experience as a superintendent with respect to the expected instructional and noninstructional outcome mean scores on the ten scales

Scales	Year of experience as a superintendent					F ratio
	0-5 years (n=14)	6-10 years (n=4)	11-15 years (n=7)	16-20 years (n=5)	20+ years (n=11)	
Teacher-Superintendent/ Board Relations	3.8731	3.8000	4.0071	4.0300	4.1682	1.507
Board Power	2.0476	2.2500	2.0952	1.8000	1.8182	1.049
Job Satisfaction	2.5000	2.1071	2.3469	2.0000	1.9610	3.265*
Salaries-Fringes	2.4286	2.6875	3.1071	2.5000	2.4318	0.951
Instruction	3.7302	3.4722	4.0317	3.7556	3.9111	1.054
Teacher Input	3.4615	3.1500	3.4429	2.8000	3.4455	0.871
Public Opinion	4.3286	3.9500	4.2286	4.2400	4.4000	0.843
Working Conditions	2.3839	2.5000	2.6429	2.1750	2.3295	0.787
Budget	2.5714	2.3750	2.6429	3.0000	2.7000	0.687
Political Involvement	1.5536	1.9375	1.5714	1.9000	1.4773	0.915

*Significant at the .05 level.

Table 20. Duncan's Multiple Range Test of experience group means among superintendents on scales with significant expected outcome mean scores were superintendents with 0-5 years experience = Group 1; 6-10 years = Group 2; 11-15 years = Group 3; 16-20 years = Group 4; and 20 or more years = Group 5

Scales	Group means in ranges from smallest to largest*				
Job Satisfaction	Group 5	Group 4	Group 2	Group 3	Group 1
	1.9610	2.0000	2.1071	2.3469	2.5000

* Any group means not underscored by the same line are significantly different at the .05 level. Any group means underscored by the same line are not significantly different at the .05 level.

superintendent experience have generally the same expectations regarding the long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining as do their colleagues with lesser amounts of superintendent experience.

CHAPTER V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

Teacher collective bargaining has become a reality for a majority of Iowa school districts. For these districts, and others who will join them, teacher collective bargaining is an annual process to determine the terms of teacher employment. The goal in most annual negotiations is to bargain the next year's contract. It appears that boards of education or teachers do little long-range planning of bargaining objectives. It also appears that no one is thoughtfully considering the long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining.

Logically, it could be quite possible that a series of one year contracts could lead to results which would be undesirable for teachers, superintendents, board members, and education as a whole. In spite of what often appears to be an adversary relationship between teachers and board representatives during annual bargaining sessions, the long-range objectives between and among both groups may not be dissimilar. That is what this investigation set out to determine.

In the preceding sections, the hypotheses of this investigation have been stated in the null form. However, for purposes of this summary they are now stated in the question form.

There were five basic questions in this investigation.

1. Do Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members differ from each other in terms of what each group expects the long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining to be?
2. Do teachers, superintendents, and board members in Iowa's twenty-five smallest school districts expect different long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining than do their counterparts in the twenty-five largest school districts?
3. Are there differences in the expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining among Iowa's elementary and secondary teachers relative to their differences in years of teaching experience, sex, and whether the salary they receive from teaching is a primary or secondary source of family income?
4. Do Iowa teachers, superintendents and board members in bargaining districts differ in their expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining from those in nonbargaining districts?
5. Are there differences in the expected long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining among Iowa superintendents relative to differences in years of experience as a superintendent?

The Collective Bargaining Survey used to collect the data needed to answer the questions was developed relative to information obtained from the review of literature, input from an Iowa State University graduate class entitled Administration of School Personnel, and input received from the pilot study. The survey instrument consisted of two major parts. The first was designed to collect various demographic information regarding each of the respondents. Specifically, the respondents were asked to provide the following data: sex, number of years in teaching, and whether the financial remuneration received from teaching is a primary or secondary source of family income from the teacher respondents; years of experience as a superintendent from the superintendent respondents; and whether the school district of which the respondent is a part has a formal teacher bargaining unit.

The second part of the Collective Bargaining Survey consisted of seventy-five "expected outcome" statements. Each respondent was asked to respond to each statement on a five point scale of "strongly agree," "agree," "neutral," "disagree," or "strongly disagree." For the purposes of reporting the findings of the investigation, the seventy-five "expected outcome" statements were grouped into ten scales as shown in Appendix C. The ten scales were Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations, Board Power, Job Satisfaction, Salary-Fringes, Instruction, Teacher Input, Public Opinion, Working Conditions,

Budget, and Political Involvement.

The grouping of the statements into scales was done by the investigator first by placing what appeared to be related statements in scales and assigning appropriate descriptive titles to the scales. Using data from the pilot study, correlation coefficients were then computed for each item comparing that item to its assigned scale and to each other scale. Based upon the results of the item to scale correlation tests, minor changes were made in item-scale assignments. Following the correlation of data from the actual investigation sample, correlation coefficients were again computed comparing each expected outcome statement to its assigned scale and each other scale. No further changes in item-scale assignments were made.

The statistical treatment of the data used to test each of the null hypotheses was then applied to each of the scales relative to the various respondent groups. Respondents were grouped for statistical comparison according to school district enrollment, position, bargaining unit and the specific demographic characteristics earlier described. The one way analysis of variance using the F ratio was used to test each of the hypotheses. Duncan's Multiple Range Test of homogenous subsets was used to determine which groups or subsets were different from others when comparisons between more than two groups were being made.

The findings from the statistical treatment of data was reported in tables using group mean scores and the F ratios to show any existing differences between and among groups relative to their teacher collective bargaining expected outcomes. Score differences were reported using the .05 and .01 levels of significance.

Question one

"Do Iowa elementary teachers, secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members differ from each other in terms of what each group expects the long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining to be?"

The F test for eight of ten scales showed significant differences in the long-range expected outcomes between the groups. On the scale Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations, there was no difference between elementary teachers and secondary teachers relative to their long-range expected outcomes. There was also no difference between superintendents and board members. However, the elementary and secondary teachers had very different expectations than did superintendents and board members. The teachers felt more positive toward the concept that teacher collective bargaining would improve working relationships between teachers and superintendents-boards of education. Superintendents and board members disagreed. Differences in expected outcomes relative to Board Power were highly significant. The elementary and secondary teachers held similar opinions in that they did not expect

collective bargaining to diminish board authority. Board members indicated a significantly different opinion from the teachers. They believed that board authority would be diminished by collective bargaining. Superintendents indicated significantly stronger feelings than even board members that bargaining would reduce the power of boards of education in making decisions regarding the operation of the schools.

The groups of respondents also indicated strong differences of opinion on the expected outcome statements which dealt with job satisfaction. Superintendents and board members agreed that teacher collective bargaining would reduce job satisfaction for teachers and themselves. The teachers, however, did not view collective bargaining as a deterrent to job satisfaction. The teachers' expectations relative to job satisfaction for all groups was different from the superintendents' and board members' at a highly significant level. Secondary teachers felt significantly more positive than even elementary teachers that collective bargaining would have a positive effect on the job satisfaction of the respective school roles.

All four groups expected that a result of teacher collective bargaining will be substantially increased salaries and fringe benefits for teachers. Secondary teachers and superintendents felt more strongly than did elementary teachers and board members regarding this issue. The elementary teachers

and board members felt significantly less certain that collective negotiations would bring about increased teacher salaries and fringe benefits.

The elementary and secondary teachers in the study held the opinion that a long-range outcome of teacher collective bargaining will be improved classroom instruction. Superintendents and board members disagreed at a highly significant level.

On the scale of statements relative to Public Opinion, elementary and secondary teachers were in agreement that teacher collective bargaining would not have a long-range detrimental effect upon the views that the public has of teachers and education in general. Superintendents and board members did not agree with the teachers and indicated a strong opinion that teacher collective bargaining would have a long-range negative effect on the esteem with which the public views teachers and public education as a whole.

Secondary teachers and superintendents were in agreement that working conditions for teachers would improve as a result of teacher collective bargaining. Elementary teachers and board members were not as certain that working conditions would be improved. Even though their expectations differed significantly from secondary teachers and superintendents, they still indicated a belief that working conditions would be improved because of collective bargaining.

All four groups believed that teacher collective bargaining would lead to greater political involvement by all factions in public education. Board members and superintendents, however, had significantly stronger opinions regarding this issue than did the teachers.

Other than on the scales of Budget and Teacher Input, the groups of respondents did differ in their long-range expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining. Most often when two of the groups did agree on their expectations, it was the two groups of teachers agreeing and the superintendents and board members agreeing. In general, the answer to question one is "yes."

Question two

"Do teachers, superintendents, and board members in Iowa's twenty-five smallest school districts expect different long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining than do their counterparts in the twenty-five largest school districts?"

There are 449 public school districts in Iowa. Excluding the Des Moines Independent Community School District, they range in total enrollment size from less than 200 to more than 22,000 students. Certainly, with this large a range in school district enrollment size, the question as to whether teachers, superintendents, and board members in large districts may have different opinions from those held by teachers, superintendents, and board members in small districts raises some speculation.

When small school district teachers in the study were compared to large school district teachers with respect to both groups' long-range expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining, significant differences were noted on only three of the scales. On the scale of questions regarding Salaries-Fringes, small school teachers were significantly less optimistic that collective bargaining would result in substantially increased salaries and fringe benefits than were their colleagues in the large school districts. Large school district teachers believe quite strongly that collective bargaining will have a long-range positive effect for them relative to salaries and fringe benefits.

On the scale of Working Conditions, teachers from large school districts were significantly more positive that working conditions would be improved through collective bargaining. While small district teachers did not disagree that collective bargaining would improve working conditions, they were certainly not as optimistic as their colleagues from the large schools.

All teachers in the study definitely believe that teacher collective bargaining will lead to greater involvement by groups of teachers, superintendents, and board members in local and state politics. Teachers from large districts did, however, express a significantly stronger opinion than teachers from small districts that teacher collective bargaining would lead

to greater political involvement by teachers, superintendents, and board members.

On the other seven scales; Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations, Board Power, Job Satisfaction, Instruction, Teacher Input, Public Opinion, and Budget; no significant differences were found to exist between the two groups. It is worth noting, however, that on all seven scales, the slight differences in the expected outcome mean scores indicated a less optimistic attitude toward teacher collective bargaining by teachers from small school districts.

The long-range expected outcomes of superintendents in large pupil enrollment school districts were compared to those of superintendents in small pupil enrollment school districts. There were significant differences on three of the scales-- Instruction, Teacher Input, and political Involvement.

On the expected outcome statements relative to instruction, both groups of superintendents indicated that they believed the long-range effect of teacher collective bargaining on instruction would be negative. Large school superintendents indicated to a significantly greater extent than their small school colleagues that collective bargaining would adversely effect classroom instruction.

There was a significant difference between the two groups' expectations relative to the amount of input teachers will have in regard to the operation of the school. Small school

superintendents agreed that teachers will have a greater impact on decisions relative to the operation of the school as a result of teacher collective bargaining. Large school superintendents did not agree that, as a result of teacher collective bargaining, teachers would have greater input into school district decisions.

Both groups of superintendents agreed that teacher collective bargaining would lead to greater political involvement by groups representing teachers, superintendents, and boards of education. Large school superintendents indicated a significantly stronger agreement with the expected outcome statements dealing with political involvement than did their small school counterparts.

On the other seven scales, there were no significant differences between the expected outcomes of the two groups of superintendents. Within each of these seven scales, there were slight differences in the expected outcome mean scores between the two groups, however, no distinct pattern of one group having more positive or negative expectations relative to teacher collective bargaining was evident.

Board members from small school districts as compared to those from large school districts were even less divided in terms of the long-range expected outcomes than were teachers and superintendents. Generally, however, board members from the large school districts expressed opinions which reflected

their belief that collective bargaining is not going to bring about long-range positive effects for teachers or education.

In the area of Teacher Input, large district board members expressed significantly different expectations than the small district board members. The board members of large schools did not believe that teacher input into the operation of the school would be increased as a result of collective bargaining. Small district board members indicated they believed that teacher input would be increased as a result of collective bargaining.

According to the large district board members, negative public opinion toward teachers, teacher demands, and education in general will be sharply increased as a result of teacher negotiations. While small district board members agree with their large school district counterparts to some extent, their opinions regarding the effects of collective bargaining on public opinion are significantly less negative than those of the large school board members.

Differences in long-range expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining between teachers, superintendents, and board members from small school districts and those from large school districts did exist. Teachers in small districts generally feel less optimistic about the positive effects of collective bargaining for themselves and education in general than do large district teachers. Small school district

superintendents and board members, conversely, feel less pessimistic regarding the long-range effects of teacher collective bargaining on both teachers and the educational system than do their large school counterparts. The answer, in general, to question two is "yes."

Question three

"Are there differences in the expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining among Iowa's elementary and secondary teachers relative to their differences in years of teaching experience, sex, and whether the salary they receive from teaching is a primary or secondary source of family income?"

Elementary and secondary teachers were considered as separate groups in analyzing the data relative to the effect that years of teaching experience, sex, and salary had on teachers opinions regarding the long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining.

Comparisons among the groups of elementary and secondary teachers relative to years of teaching experience were done by further dividing each group of teachers into experience groups. The experience groups were made up of teachers with 0-5 years of experience, 6-10 years of experience, 11-15 years of experience, 16-20 years of experience, and 20 or more years of experience.

On the scales Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations, Public Opinion, and Political Involvement elementary teachers who had five or fewer years of teaching experience had

significantly different expected outcome mean scores than elementary teachers in the other experience groups. The elementary teachers with 0-5 years of teaching experience believed that collective bargaining will result in improved relations between teachers, superintendents, and board members. Elementary teachers with more years of experience were more inclined to believe that teacher collective bargaining would not improve teacher-superintendent/board relations.

Elementary teachers with fewer years of teaching experience, particularly those with five or less years of teaching experience, believed that public opinion toward teachers, teacher demands, and education in general will be improved as a result of collective bargaining. Teachers with more years of experience, particularly those with more than ten years experience, disagreed with their less experienced colleagues.

Elementary teachers with 0-5 years of experience were less inclined to expect a long-range outcome of collective bargaining to be increased political involvement by those involved in the educational process. All other elementary teachers expressed a strong opinion that collective bargaining will result in increased political involvement.

Although there were no significant differences among elementary teachers on each of the seven other expected outcome scales when years of teaching experience was a variable,

teachers with less experience did indicate slightly more optimistic views toward what collective bargaining could bring about for teachers and education in general.

Comparisons of expected outcomes of collective bargaining among secondary teachers when years of teaching experience is a variable indicated some of the same differences as existed among elementary teachers.

Secondary teachers in the 0-5 years of experience group were significantly different from the more experienced secondary teachers in their belief that job satisfaction would be increased as a result of collective bargaining. All secondary teachers tended to believe that collective bargaining will increase job satisfaction, but not to the extent that the least experienced teachers indicated.

The least experienced group of secondary teachers also expected that teacher collective bargaining will improve public opinion toward teachers, teacher demands, and education in general. Teachers with more experience tended to disagree that public opinion will be improved as a result of collective bargaining.

As was true among elementary teachers, secondary teachers with less years of experience were generally more optimistic regarding the outcomes of teacher collective bargaining on all scales than were the more experienced secondary teachers.

When sex of the teacher was a variable, no significant differences in long-range expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining between male and female teachers among either elementary or secondary teachers were found. Both male and female teachers within each of the teacher groups expressed similar opinions on each of the expected outcome scales.

More than seventy per cent of the teachers responding to the survey indicated that their salary for teaching is a primary source of family income. The remaining teachers indicated that their teaching salary is a secondary source of family income. This variable had very little effect on the responses of the teachers. There was a significant difference in the mean responses only on the scale relative to budget. On that scale, teachers whose salary is a primary source of family income were more inclined to agree that teacher collective bargaining would have a long-range effect on school budgets. The salary variable did not account for expected outcome differences among teachers on any other scales.

The answer to question two is multi-faceted in as much as three different demographic variables were considered. Years of teaching experience does make a difference in long-range expected outcome responses, particularly between teachers with less than five years experience and those with more than five years experience. The answer to question three with regard to the variable of teacher sex, is clearly "no." Whether or not

a teacher's salary is a primary or secondary source of family income seems to have very little effect on the long-range outcomes which teachers expect as a result of teacher collective bargaining.

Question four

"Do Iowa teachers, superintendents, and board members in bargaining districts differ in their expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining from those in nonbargaining districts?"

The sample population for this investigation was selected from fifty Iowa school districts. Of these fifty school districts, twenty-five had the largest pupil enrollments in Iowa (excluding the Des Moines Independent Community School District), and twenty-five had the smallest pupil enrollments in Iowa. All twenty-five of the large school districts were involved in teacher collective bargaining authorized by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act. Only four of the small districts had implemented formal teacher collective bargaining.

Nearly sixty-eight per cent of the teachers responding to the questionnaire were from school districts which had a formal bargaining unit. These teachers expressed significantly different views from the nonbargaining teachers in regard to the long-range expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining.

Teachers from school districts with a formal teacher bargaining unit were significantly more inclined to believe that teacher collective bargaining will improve teacher-

superintendent/board relations. Teachers from nonbargaining districts tended to believe that collective bargaining would not improve teacher-superintendent/board relations.

All teachers indicated that they expected board power to be diminished by collective bargaining. Teachers from bargaining units, however, were significantly more strong in this belief. According to the teacher respondents, job satisfaction will be increased as a result of teacher collective bargaining. There was a highly significant difference between the expected outcome mean scores. Teachers from nonbargaining districts indicated that they were more inclined than the teachers from bargaining districts to believe that collective bargaining would result in greater job satisfaction.

Both groups of teachers believe that salaries and fringes will be improved as a result of teacher collective bargaining. Teachers in the bargaining districts were significantly more positive than the nonbargaining teachers that collective bargaining will improve salaries and fringes.

There were significant differences between the teachers on the Teacher Input scale. Teachers from bargaining districts were more inclined to believe that teachers would not have a greater amount of impact on decisions effecting the school program.

All teachers were of the opinion that their working conditions will be improved as a result of collective bargaining.

Teachers from bargaining districts were significantly more positive than nonbargaining teachers that working conditions will be improved.

Political involvement by groups representing teachers, administrators, and board members will be increased as a result of collective bargaining, according to the teacher respondents. Teachers from bargaining districts were significantly more strongly inclined to believe that political involvement will be increased.

On the other three scales: Instruction, Public Opinion, and Budget the teachers from districts with formal bargaining units did not differ significantly in their expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining from nonbargaining teachers.

Differences between superintendents from bargaining districts and those from nonbargaining districts were not as great as were the differences among the teachers when considering bargaining unit as a variable.

Superintendents generally believe that collective bargaining will not improve teacher-superintendent/board relations. Superintendents from bargaining units expect collective bargaining to produce an even greater adversary relationship than do the nonbargaining superintendents.

Superintendent respondents believed that instruction will not be improved as a result of collective bargaining. Again, superintendents from bargaining districts were significantly

less inclined to believe that teacher collective bargaining will increase the quality of classroom instruction.

According to the superintendents, school budgets will be effected directly by collective bargaining. Bargaining district superintendents were much more sure of this than were superintendents from nonbargaining districts.

There was a highly significant difference in opinions among the superintendents regarding political involvement. Superintendents from bargaining districts were much stronger than nonbargaining districts' superintendents in their opinion that political involvement by teachers, administrators, and board members will be increased as a result of collective bargaining.

There were only very slight differences in the mean responses among the superintendents on the scales of Board Power, Job Satisfaction, Salaries-Fringes, Teacher Input, Public Opinion, and Working Conditions when considering bargaining unit as a variable.

Differences between board members from districts with formal bargaining units and those from districts without formal teacher bargaining units were very slight. Only in the area of teacher input were there significant differences in long-range expected outcomes among the board members. Board members from nonbargaining districts believe that teacher input into determination of educational program will be increased as a

result of collective bargaining while board members from districts with formal teacher bargaining units disagree. On all other scales, the board members were in close agreement as to the expected long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining.

The answer to question four among teachers is a definite "yes." The answer is also "yes" when considering the responses of superintendents from bargaining and nonbargaining school districts. In the case of board members, however, there is very little difference in mean responses between board members from districts with formal teacher bargaining units and those from nonbargaining districts.

Question five

"Are there differences in the expected long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining among Iowa superintendents relative to differences in years of experience as a superintendent?"

Comparisons of expected outcome responses among the superintendents relative to years of experience as a superintendent was done by dividing the superintendents into experience groups similar to the teacher experience groups. The experience groups were composed of superintendents with 0-5 years of experience, 6-10 years of experience, 11-15 years of experience, 16-20 years of experience, and 20 or more years of experience.

The only area in which there was disagreement among the superintendents when years of experience as a superintendent was a variable was in the area of job satisfaction. The superintendents in the experience group 0-5 years of experience were significantly less inclined to believe that collective bargaining will reduce job satisfaction. On all other scales, superintendents tended to be in close agreement on the long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining regardless of their differences in tenure as a superintendent.

The answer to question five is generally "no." Differences of opinion among superintendents, when length of service as a superintendent was a variable, were not significant.

Limitations

The investigation was directed toward discovering what elementary and secondary teachers, superintendents, and board members believe will be the long-range outcomes of teacher collective bargaining under Iowa's relatively new collective bargaining law. Responses were likely to have been made primarily on the basis of personal values and attitudes and, therefore, raise speculation in terms of the yield of purely objective data. A specific attitude expressed on a survey of the type used in this study may be the result of a recent event in the respondent's experience which may have an effect upon the respondent's attitude at the time of completing the

survey but may not be a long term or highly valued attitude. The time frame of the attitudes or expected outcomes data collected in this study is limited to the period of time used to complete the survey.

No attempt was made to investigate the opinions of building principals or other administrators (i.e., personnel directors) who may have a role in the administration of the master contract.

The investigation dealt with a sample of teachers, superintendents, and board members from just the twenty-five largest (excluding Des Moines) and twenty-five smallest pupil enrollment school districts in Iowa. However, it was reasoned that attempts to sample a broader selection of schools would have made it more difficult to clearly delineate any attitude differences between large and small school districts.

It was impossible to determine, other than if a respondent was from a bargaining or nonbargaining district, the amount of previous education or direct experience a respondent may have had prior to answering the questionnaire. The amount of information that an individual has regarding a particular subject certainly affects that person's attitudes and values about that subject.

Thus the following caveats should be considered when interpreting the findings and conclusions of this investigation:

1. Several responses to the survey indicated that teacher collective bargaining is an emotionally charged issue. Therefore, the conclusions of this study are based primarily on less than objective data since the respondents likely answered the questionnaire on the basis of personal values and attitudes.
2. No administrators other than superintendents were included in the study.
3. The investigation was conducted in only fifty of Iowa's 449 school districts.
4. It was not determined to what degree the respondents differed in terms of knowledge and direct experience relative to collective bargaining prior to completing the questionnaire.

Discussion

The expectations one holds for a particular process or event are highly dependent upon past experience, intellectual understanding, and the personal value system one has developed. For many of the key participants, the teacher collective bargaining process in Iowa represents a startling new experience in which they have become involved. They have, in many cases, entered into this new process with a very minimal amount of preparation, either through education or direct experience.

The findings of this investigation indicate that teachers generally believe that collective bargaining will be beneficial

to themselves and to public education in general. Superintendents and board members conversely believe that teacher collective bargaining will be generally detrimental to education. All three groups have formulated these opinions on the basis of limited knowledge and very little direct experience. Their expectations are based upon what they "think" will happen. Teacher collective bargaining, at this early stage, may be a "Fairy God Mother" or a "Boogey Man" depending upon individual perceptions affected more by job role than by factual data.

In states where teacher collective bargaining has been a reality for longer periods of time, very little has been done to determine outcomes other than in the areas of teacher salaries and fringe benefits. Only recently has the Department of Health, Education and Welfare become interested in the long-range effects of teacher collective bargaining on a broad spectrum of educational issues. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Education has recently contracted with the Rand Corporation to conduct a five year longitudinal study on the effects of teacher collective bargaining. This study is expected to determine the long-range effects of teacher collective bargaining on class size provisions, teacher evaluation, professional growth and in-service, use of aides and specialists, and teacher participation in textbook selection and curriculum review.

With data from objective longitudinal studies like the Rand study perhaps it will be possible to empirically measure the long-range effects of teacher collective bargaining on our public education system. One suspects, however, that by then the mold will be cast and any detrimental effects of teacher collective bargaining will be irreversible. Perhaps, therefore, it would be advisable to carefully study the data reported herein, modify the extreme opinions in the light of sound judgement relative to the educational needs of Iowa's youth, and seek a working relationship between teachers and superintendents-boards of education based upon mutual respect and a sound educational philosophy.

Recommendations

(1) A longitudinal study, similar to the one described earlier, should be conducted in Iowa to determine the long-range effects of teacher collective bargaining.

(2) Differences in expectations between respondents from large school and small school districts, particularly teachers, should be verified to determine whether the differences indicated in this study were based upon characteristics of people from less populated areas or whether the differences were simply an indication of differences in knowledge and direct experience with collective bargaining.

(3) An analysis of master contracts should be made annually to determine if there are issues other than those included in this study being effected by teacher collective bargaining.

(4) A longitudinal study of key participants in the teacher collective bargaining process should be conducted to determine if those with less experience in their job roles will continue to express significantly different attitudes toward collective bargaining or if job experience will tend to modify their opinions toward the group mean.

(5) Since public schools are supported and controlled, at least in part, by people in the local community, every attempt should be made to help the general public understand the effects of teacher collective bargaining on the educational system.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to express his gratitude to Dr. Ross A. Engel for his valuable assistance in the development and completion of this study. While serving as teacher and advisor, he has provided guidance and encouragement throughout the doctoral program.

Special appreciation is offered to the writer's wife, LaVonne, and children, Shelly, Wendy, and Marne for their sacrifices and encouragement during the years of graduate study. When Dad would become discouraged these four special people would pick him up with their love and understanding.

APPENDIX A: LETTER ACCOMPANYING QUESTIONNAIRE
AND QUESTIONNAIRE

IOWA STATE
UNIVERSITY

Telephone 515-294-4143

April 27, 1977

Dear Colleagues Interested In Public Education:

As part of a research project being conducted at Iowa State University, an attempt is being made to determine the instructional and non-instructional long-range outcomes that Iowa teachers, superintendents, and board members expect as a result of teacher collective bargaining.

Several states have had teacher collective bargaining statutes for longer periods of time than Iowa. Little research has been done in these other states, however, to measure the actual outcomes of this bargaining process. Won't you please join us in helping educators in Iowa do what educators in other states have not done?

In order to collect the necessary data for this project, the enclosed questionnaire was developed and field tested. You are now being asked to participate in this study by completing the enclosed "Collective Bargaining Survey" and returning it in the envelope provided.


Your responses will remain anonymous and all data collected will be studied as group data.

Thank you very much for your assistance in this important study.

Sincerely,



Dr. Ross A. Engel
Educational Administration



Harlan Else, Researcher

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SURVEY

Most Iowa public school teachers now bargain collectively under the provisions of the Public Employment Relations Act. The purpose of this questionnaire is to determine your attitudes about expected outcomes of teacher collective bargaining in Iowa.

I. Please check the appropriate responses:

1. Does your school district have a teacher bargaining unit certified by the Public Relations Employment Board?

yes; no

2. Your Position: (check one)

Elementary (k-6) Teacher; Secondary (7-12) Teacher; Superintendent;
 Board Member

3. If a superintendent, indicate total years of experience as a superintendent:

0-5; 6-10; 11-15; 16-20; more than 20.

4. If an elementary or secondary teacher answer the following:

a. Total years of teaching experience:

0-5; 6-10; 11-15; 16-20; more than 20.

b. Sex: male; female

c. Is your salary from teaching a primary source of family income?

yes; no

DIRECTIONS: Indicate your response to each item by placing a check or an "X" in the box which best describes your attitude toward each item.

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
1. . . . provide a positive step toward improved teacher-administration-board relationships.					
2. . . . provide an <u>orderly</u> way for teachers and school boards-administrators to work out their differences.					
3. . . . provide a <u>positive</u> way for teachers and school boards-administrators to work out their differences.					
4. . . . diminish the school board's right to determine instructional policies.					
5. . . . make the relationship between teachers and administrators a more adversary relationship.					
6. . . . make the relationship between teachers and board members a more adversary relationship.					
7. . . . weaken the school principal's role as an instructional leader.					
8. . . . shift disputes between teachers and boards of education from wages and working conditions to control of educational policy.					

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
9. . . . increase the possibilities of teacher strikes in Iowa.					
10. . . . reduce the number of disputes between teachers, administrators and school boards as each of these groups become more experienced with the process.					
11. . . . help teachers, administrators and school boards gain greater satisfaction from their respective roles.					
12. . . . discourage many of the best people from seeking positions on boards of education.					
13. . . . cause an increase in the number of grievances filed by teachers against administrators.					
14. . . . result in substantially higher salaries for teachers than would have resulted without collective bargaining.					
15. . . . result in substantially increased fringe benefits for teachers than would have resulted without collective bargaining.					
16. . . . result in more meaningful in-service training for teachers than existed before teacher collective bargaining.					
17. . . . result in teachers having more input into the development of the school budget.					
18. . . . result in improved working conditions for teachers.					
19. . . . improve teacher-principal relationships.					
20. . . . result in teaching being viewed as less of a profession by the general public.					
21. . . . discourage many of the best people from seeking a career as a teacher.					
22. . . . increase public support for teachers' demands.					
23. . . . result in the development of improved teacher evaluation procedures.					
24. . . . result in an increase in the quality of work done by teachers.					
25. . . . result in a decreased number of annual teacher firings in Iowa.					
26. . . . cause administrators to develop new leadership styles.					
27. . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association being viewed by teachers more as a labor union than a professional association.					
28. . . . result in an increased number of college graduates who will want to enter teaching.					
29. . . . result in increased teacher job security.					
30. . . . discourage many of the best people from seeking a career as an administrator.					

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
31. . . . result in teachers becoming the primary developers of school curriculum.					
32. . . . result in teachers having an increased voice in determining which teacher applicants are hired by a particular school district.					
33. . . . result in teachers assuming the primary role of change agents in the school's instructional program.					
34. . . . result in improved student classroom behavior.					
35. . . . result in teachers having a greater impact on which and how many library books are purchased.					
36. . . . result in teachers having a greater impact on the implementation of instructional programs which employ special teachers.					
37. . . . result in education in general being held in higher esteem by the public.					
38. . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association being viewed by administrators more as a labor union than as a professional association.					
39. . . . result in teachers having a greater impact on the selection of textbooks for classroom use.					
40. . . . result in teacher bargaining units and boards of education being less likely to reach impasse on negotiable items as they gain experience in the negotiating process.					
41. . . . result in an increased number of negotiable items in future years.					
42. . . . result in an increased use of professional negotiators by teacher bargaining units.					
43. . . . result in an increase in funds expended by teacher bargaining units to finance the bargaining process.					
44. . . . result in an increase in funds expended by boards of education to finance the bargaining process.					
45. . . . result in a decrease in the number of years a superintendent will remain in a particular school district.					
46. . . . result in a decrease in the number of years board members will serve on boards of education.					
47. . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association being viewed by board members more as a labor union than as a professional association.					
48. . . . result in the breakdown of the traditional lines of authority from teachers to the board of education.					
49. . . . result in boards of education making fewer independent policy decisions.					
50. . . . result in teachers being able to select their building principal.					
51. . . . result in an increased use of professional negotiators by boards of education.					
52. . . . result in teachers taking an increased interest and involvement in local school board elections.					

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

	STRONGLY AGREE	AGREE	NEUTRAL	DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE
53. . . . result in an increase in the amount of non-certified teacher-aid help provided teachers.					
54. . . . result in teachers having a greater impact on the amount and type of classroom materials purchased with funds from the general budget.					
55. . . . result in teachers having a greater impact on which standardized tests are used to measure student progress and how the results of these tests are used.					
56. . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association being viewed by the public more as a labor union than as a professional association.					
57. . . . result in teachers having definite daily working hours of service.					
58. . . . result in teachers being paid "overtime" if they are required to attend late afternoon or evening meetings such as staff meetings, P.T.A., etc.					
59. . . . result in the school calender being negotiated between teachers and the board.					
60. . . . result in class sizes being reduced.					
61. . . . result in an improvement in the quality of administration.					
62. . . . result in an improvement in the quality of boardmanship.					
63. . . . result in an improvement in the quality of classroom instruction.					
64. . . . result in an improved education for dollars expended.					
65. . . . result in increased political involvement by the Iowa Association of School Boards. (school board association)					
66. . . . result in a demand by principals to bargain collectively with boards of education.					
67. . . . result in a demand by non-certified school personnel to bargain collectively with boards of education.					
68. . . . result in teachers being able to negotiate the criteria of teacher evaluation.					
69. . . . result in a greater percentage of the school budget being spent for teachers' salaries.					
70. . . . result in increased political involvement by the I.A.S.A. (state superintendents' association)					
71. . . . result in contingency funds and carry-over balances in the school district general fund being reduced.					
72. . . . result in increased chances of success in passing school bond elections.					
73. . . . result in the development of improved school facilities.					
74. . . . result in increased efforts toward reorganization between Iowa school districts.					
75. . . . result in increased political involvement by the Iowa State Education Association. (teachers' association)					

APPENDIX B: FOLLOW-UP LETTER

IOWA STATE
UNIVERSITY

College of Education
Professional Studies
201 Curtiss Hall
Ames, Iowa 50011

Telephone 515-294-4143

May 9, 1977

Dear Colleagues Interested In Public Education:

About two weeks ago you received a "Collective Bargaining Survey" like the one enclosed. If you completed and returned the one sent earlier, disregard this survey. If not, please help us in completing this important study by completing the enclosed survey and returning it immediately.

Because of the small number of people being asked to participate in this study, it is very important that each person respond. Please assist us in this important study by completing and returning the enclosed survey.

Your responses will remain anonymous and all data collected will be studied as group data.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Harlan Else

APPENDIX C: EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS
CATEGORIZED BY SCALES

SCALE: Teacher-Superintendent/Board Relations

EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS:

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

1. . . . provide a positive step toward improved teacher-administration-board relationships.
2. . . . provide an orderly way for teachers and school boards-administrators to work out their differences.
3. . . . provide a positive way for teachers and school boards-administrators to work out their differences.
5. . . . make the relationship between teachers and administrators a more adversary relationship.
6. . . . make the relationship between teachers and board members a more adversary relationship.
9. . . . increase the possibilities of teacher strikes in Iowa.
10. . . . reduce the number of disputes between teachers, administrators, and school boards as each of these groups become more experienced with the process.
13. . . . cause an increase in the number of grievances filed by teachers against administrators.
19. . . . improve teacher-principal relationships.
27. . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association being viewed by teachers more as a labor union than a professional association.
38. . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association being viewed by administrators more as a labor union than a professional association.

- 40. . . . result in teacher bargaining units and boards of education being less likely to reach impasse on negotiable items as they gain experience in the negotiating process.
- 42. . . . result in an increased use of professional negotiators by teacher bargaining units.
- 43. . . . result in an increase in funds expended by teacher bargaining units to finance the bargaining process.
- 44. . . . result in an increase in funds expended by boards of education to finance the bargaining process.
- 47. . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association being viewed by board members more as a labor union than as a professional association.
- 48. . . . result in the breakdown of the traditional lines of authority from teachers to the board of education.
- 51. . . . result in an increased use of professional negotiators by boards of education.
- 61. . . . result in an improvement in the quality of administration.
- 62. . . . result in an improvement in the quality of boardmanship.

SCALE: Board Power

EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS:

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

- 4. . . . diminish the school board's right to determine instructional policies.
- 8. . . . shift disputes between teachers and boards of education from wages and working conditions to control of educational policy.
- 41. . . . result in an increased number of negotiable items in future years.

- 49. . . . result in boards of education making fewer independent policy decisions.
- 66. . . . result in a demand by principals to bargain collectively with boards of education.
- 67. . . . result in a demand by noncertified school personnel to bargain collectively with boards of education.

SCALE: Job Satisfaction

EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS:

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

- 11. . . . help teachers, administrators and school boards gain greater satisfaction from their respective roles.
- 12. . . . discourage many of the best people from seeking positions on boards of education.
- 21. . . . discourage many of the best people from seeking a career as a teacher.
- 28. . . . result in an increased number of college graduates who will want to enter teaching.
- 30. . . . discourage many of the best people from seeking a career as an administrator.
- 45. . . . result in a decrease in the number of years a superintendent will remain in a particular school district.
- 46. . . . result in a decrease in the number of years board members will serve on boards of education.

SCALE: Salaries-Fringes

EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS:

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

- 14. . . . result in substantially higher salaries for teachers than would have resulted without collective bargaining.

- 15. . . . result in substantially increased fringe benefits for teachers than would have resulted without collective bargaining.
- 25. . . . result in a decreased number of annual teacher firings in Iowa.
- 69. . . . result in a greater percentage of the school budget being spent for teachers' salaries.

SCALE: Instruction

EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS:

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

- 7. . . . weaken the school principal's role as an instructional leader.
- 16. . . . result in more meaningful in-service training for teachers than existed before teacher collective bargaining.
- 24. . . . result in an increase in the quality of work done by teachers.
- 34. . . . result in improved student classroom behavior.
- 53. . . . result in an increase in the amount of non-certified teacher-aid help provided teachers.
- 60. . . . result in class sizes being reduced.
- 63. . . . result in an improvement in the quality of classroom instruction.
- 64. . . . result in an improved education for dollars expended.
- 73. . . . result in the development of improved school facilities.

SCALE: Teacher Input

EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS:

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

17. . . . result in teachers having more input into the development of the school budget.
31. . . . result in teachers becoming the primary developers of school curriculum.
32. . . . result in teachers having an increased voice in determining which teacher applicants are hired by a particular school district.
33. . . . result in teachers assuming the primary role of change agents in the school's instructional program.
35. . . . result in teachers having a greater impact on which and how many library books are purchased.
36. . . . result in teachers having a greater impact on the implementation of instructional programs which employ special teachers.
39. . . . result in teachers having a greater impact on the selection of textbooks for classroom use.
50. . . . result in teachers being able to select their building principal.
54. . . . result in teachers having a greater impact on the amount and type of classroom materials purchased with funds from the general budget.
55. . . . result in teachers having a greater impact on which standardized tests are used to measure student progress and how the results of these tests are used.

SCALE: Public Opinion

EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS:

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

- 20. . . . result in teaching being viewed as less of a profession by the general public.
- 22. . . . increase public support for teachers' demands.
- 37. . . . result in education in general being held in higher esteem by the public.
- 56. . . . result in the Iowa State Education Association being viewed by the public more as a labor union than as a professional association.
- 72. . . . result in increased chances of success in passing school bond elections.

SCALE: Working Conditions

EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS:

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

- 18. . . . result in improved working conditions for teachers.
- 23. . . . result in the development of improved teacher evaluation procedures.
- 26. . . . cause administrators to develop new leadership styles.
- 29. . . . result in increased teacher job security.
- 57. . . . result in teachers having definite daily working hours of service.
- 58. . . . result in teachers being paid "overtime" if they are required to attend late afternoon or evening meetings such as staff meetings, P.T.A., etc.

59. . . . result in the school calender being negotiated between teachers and the board.
68. . . . result in teachers being able to negotiate the criteria of teacher evaluation.

SCALE: Budget

EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS:

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

71. . . . result in contingency funds and carry-over balances in the school district general fund being reduced.
74. . . . result in increased efforts toward reorganization between Iowa school districts.

SCALE: Political Involvement

EXPECTED OUTCOME STATEMENTS:

Teacher collective bargaining, as determined by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, will:

52. . . . result in teachers taking an increased interest and involvement in local school board elections.
65. . . . result in increased political involvement by the Iowa Association of School Boards. (school board association)
70. . . . result in increased political involvement by the I.A.S.A. (state superintendents' association)
75. . . . result in increased political involvement by the Iowa State Education Association. (teachers' association)